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Jedediah Purdy
Political thinkers have long asked whether freedom might be self-undermining,
tending to erode the liberal rights and democratic politics that form its foundations. 1
Anxious liberals like John Stuart Mill and meliorist conservatives like Alexis de
Tocqueville worried that democracy threatened to swamp freedom under the “tyranny of
the majority” or “democratic despotism.”2 These grim warnings carried very old political
arguments into the democratic era. Thinkers as eminent and diverse as Plato and the
English monarchist Robert Filmer (John Locke’s target in the Two Treatises on
Government) has argued that a society dedicated to personal freedom and collective selfgovernment would degenerate into personal self-indulgence and political mob rule.3
After the liberal and democratic revolutions in France, the United States, and elsewhere,
radicals on both the left and the right took up the same arguments. Arch-reactionary
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Throughout this article, I use “liberal” to refer to a commitment to autonomy-protecting personal rights as
a basic normative principle of political and legal order. I use “democratic” to refer to a commitment both
to majoritarian government through elections and, more broadly, the idea that the collective selfgovernment of political communities is a basic normative principle of political and legal order.
2
See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 690-95 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) (1850) (describing a despotism of innumerable small forms of
interference with personal liberty); id. at 246-61 (describing “the tyranny of the majority,” a more direct
application of power by a regnant majority over a vulnerable minority); JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 71-74 (Geraint Williams, ed., Everyman, 1993) (1859) (describing evolution of the idea of the
tyranny of the majority from the simple version of electoral domination to the more complex idea the subtle
limitation on the freedom and judgment of each by the opinions as well as the political power of all).
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See ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA 2 (identifying the wish for self-government with original sin)
28-29 (summarizing a long history of attacks on the character of democracies as violent, unstable, and
tending to elevate selfish and sadistic leaders over nobler characters) (Johann Somerville ed., Cambridge
University Press, 1991) (1680); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 240-43 (Book VIII) (Allan Bloom ed. & trans.,
U. Chicago Press, 1991) (examining the argument that unbalanced devotion to personal freedom and
relativism among desires and opinions undermine liberty and self-government, so that “[t]oo much freedom
seems to change into nothing but too much slavery, both for private man and city” and “tyranny is probably
established out of no other regime than democracy … the greatest and most savage slavery out of the
extreme of freedom,” id. at 242).
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Joseph de Maistre proclaimed that the French Revolution’s defiance of established
authority would bring anarchy and drown Europe in seas of blood.4 The leftists of the
Frankfort School argued that the liberal doctrine of personal autonomy found its
perfection in the cruel nihilism of the Marquis de Sade and Friedrich Nietzsche.5 The
twentieth century produced a new genre of anxious liberal. European fascism and postcolonial nationalism both suggested that free men and women would flock to doctrines
that made them unfree: promises of ethnic unity, moral clarity, and impeccable
authority.6 The same question has re-emerged in Iraq, where political chaos implies that
no democratic center can hold, and across the Arab world, where pessimists predict that
democracy would mean the end of already scant liberal rights and, in time, of elections as
well.7
As is often true when a lawyer addresses a question formulated by political
theorists, I suspect there is no universal answer to the question of whether freedom is
self-undermining. Instead, the answer is the sum of the answers to many particular
4

For an introduction to de Maistre’s thought, see ISAIAH BERLIN, Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of
Fascism, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 91174 (Henry Hardy, ed.) (1991). Particularly vivid examples of de Maistre’s worldview, in which human
existence is soaked in blood and all violence and suffering are punishment for the sin of an inherent
debased human nature, appear at 111, 117, and 163.
5
See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 81-119
(trans. John Cumming) (1972).
6
One can find versions of this anxiety on left and right alike. See, e.g., ASHIS NANDY, THE
ILLEGITMACY OF NATIONALISM: RABINDRANATH TAGORE AND THE POLITICS OF SELF
89-90 (1994) (discussing the recapitulation of colonial violence and submission in the politics of postindependence nationalism); V.S. NAIPAUL, AMONG THE BELIEVER 261, 297-305 (1981) (describing
the development of a popular Islamic political identity in newly self-governing countries as pathological
and violent); FOUAD AJAMI, THE DREAM PALACE OF THE ARABS 233 and passim (1998)
(describing the rise of nationalism in post-colonial Arab politics as destructive of customs of tolerance and
pluralism).
7
See, e.g., James Glanz, A Little Democracy or a Genie Unbottled?, N.Y. TIMES X1 [Week in Review],
Jan. 29, 2006 (discussing the victory of the Islamist party Hamas in Palestinian elections and asking
whether political self-government is consistent with either liberty or order in illiberal settings). The major
recent statement of this concern is FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD (2003) (arguing that transitions from non-democratic to
democratic rule are hazardous to liberal freedoms unless independent institutions have emerged to protect
such freedoms, including civil society, reliable laws and courts, and orderly economic structures).
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questions: whether and when popular elections undermine liberal rights, how free
markets enhance or undermine democracy, and so forth. In this article, I address a
neglected part of the problem in a central area of contemporary freedom: reproductive
autonomy. I ask whether reproductive autonomy can undermine the political conditions
that sustain it: a political and legal culture committed to individual rights and, even more
basically, the stability of the political order across generations.8 The reason to fear that
reproductive freedom might be self-undermining is based in two demographic crises. In
the world’s richest countries, particularly in Europe and Northeast Asia, fertility rates –
the number of children the average woman will bear in her lifetime – have fallen well
below the level needed to replace existing population.9 Meanwhile, in the largest and
more important developing countries, India and China, young men outnumber young
women by scores of millions, and the gap between the sexes is growing.10
Each trend is the aggregate result of hundreds of millions of increasingly
autonomous reproductive decisions.11 Fertility rates are below replacement level where
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By “even more basically,” I mean simply that all political liberties depend on the viability of the political
order that enforces them.
9
See, e.g., Europe’s Population Implosion, THE ECONOMIST (July 19, 2003). I discuss this trend and
present sources in I.A.1, below.
10
See, e.g., VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ASIA’S SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 58-59 (2004). I discuss this
trend and present sources in I.A.2, below.
11
The discussion of the previous two paragraphs, invoking changes in technology, social structure, law,
and culture (or, if one prefers, personal preferences), imply something I should now make explicit. When I
refer to “reproductive autonomy,” I do not mean exclusively or even primarily the legally protected access
to abortion and/or contraception that United States commentators tend to designate by the term. I am
deliberately referring to the whole suite of factors make women and families inclined and able to exercise
self-conscious agency in whether and when to bear children. In expanding the term I am not trying to make
any normative point about the desirability or adequacy of uses of the term that focuses on legal protections
(although as it happens I have conventional liberal views about the rights of contraception and abortion). I
intend the term analytically, to describe autonomy in the substantive sense of the measure of control
women and families can and do exercise over reproduction, as distinct from a focus exclusively on what
they are legally permitted to do. As will become evident, my discussions of freedom and autonomy
throughout this article use a substantive rather than a legally formal sense of these terms, not because I
reject the formal version but because I find the substantive versions helpful in a productive engagement
with the questions that drive the article.
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legal, economic, and social equality between the sexes and increasingly individualistic
values lead people to choose careers and non-traditional intimate relationships over
childrearing, and legal contraception and abortion enable them to enforce those choices.12
Asia’s sex disproportion comes from parents’ growing technological power to select their
children’s sex through pre-natal testing and abortions of female fetuses, a preference that
arises from both cultural attitudes and economic incentives.13
Both trends also have serious consequences for political order. Sub-replacement
fertility threatens to cripple public pension systems by burdening shrinking numbers of
working adults with the support of growing numbers of retirees.14 The one sure way to
avoid this result, liberalizing immigration laws to let foreign-born workers replace neverborn native workers, would be such a goad to xenophobic and nationalist politics that
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See, e.g., Johan Surkyn & Ron Lesthaeghe, Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition
in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe: An Update, DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH Special
Collection 3, at 62-75 (April 17, 2004). I develop this dimension of the argument throughout the article.
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The knottiest part of my formulation is the characterization of sex-selective abortion as an expression of
autonomy in China, where reproductive decisions re taken under the pressure of the state’s notorious
population-control policies. For an introduction to the policy backdrop of this problem, see SUSAN
GREENHALGH & EDWIN A. WINCKLER, GOVERNING CHINA’S POPULATION: FROM
LENINIST TO NEOLIBERAL BIOPOLITICS 19-44 (describing the interaction of demographics and
political power in China), 166-201 (presenting relevant policy developments under the present Hu
government). It would have been possible to avoid this problem by simply cordoning off China from my
discussion: India, Taiwan, and other Asian countries have sufficiently dramatic sex ratios that China is not
an analytically necessary part of the story. I have chosen to include it for several reasons. First, it is in
many respects, including differential cultural valuation of sons and daughters and the respective economic
incentives to bear boys and girls, the same story as in non-authoritarian regimes. Second, the sense in
which I am using “freedom” or “autonomy” is not restricted to legal permission to act, but includes the
broader set of determinants of what one is in fact able to do with oneself and one’s life, which human
potential one is able to realize in action. In this respect, the availability of the same sex-selection-enabling
technologies in China as in India and elsewhere is an increase in autonomy, and the effect of that increase
under relevant constraints is precisely what interests me. I draw this way of thinking about freedom from
the work of Amartya Sen, which I briefly discuss in Part V, below. Third, while political authoritarianism
is a distinctive kind of evil, and I make no apologies for it, it is my argument that reproductive decisions are
made under a variety of constraints, some subtler than others, which interact with political freedom or
repression in influencing the consequences of reproductive choice for demographics. Thus I am interested
in all the constraints that bear on reproductive decisions, and on ways to overcome or mitigate them – not
just in the decisions people make under “optimally free” or even approximately free circucmstances.
14
See, e.g.., Europe’s Population Implosion, supra n. 9. I discuss this phenomenon much more fully in
I.A.1 and IV, below.
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most observers regard it as politically impossible.15 Moreover, declining population
historically inspires reactionary politics, with particular hostility toward women’s
autonomy, in settings as diverse as Augustan Rome and eighteenth-century France.16 The
other trend, disproportionately male populations – which implies large numbers of
unmarried young men – is historically associated with growth in armies, military
adventurism, and organized crime and social disorder. These, in turn, are allied with
authoritarian and illiberal politics.17 Today the problem is likely worse: unmarried and
young men are the engines of nationalist and fundamentalist politics, which poses a threat
to liberal and democratic prospects in the places where sex disproportion is most
pronounced.18 In both cases, then, individual autonomy has systemic consequences that
threaten to undermine the very features of political order that sustain autonomy.19 This is
a troubling miniature of the timeless pessimistic argument that freedom in general is selfundermining.
15

See, e.g., Jonathan Grant et al., LOW FERTILITY AND POPULATION AGING 135 (report of the
Rand Corporation, Europe) (available at http:/www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG206/ (last visited Nov.
20, 2005) (“The sheer numbers of immigrants that are needed to prevent population ageing [sic] in the EU
and its Member States are not acceptable in the current socio-political climate prevailing in Europe”). I
address this issue further in I.A.1, below.
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See CAROL BLUM, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: POPULATION, REPRODUCTION, AND POWER
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 1-4 (2002); TIM G. PARKIN, DEMOGRAPHY AND ROMAN
SOCIETY 111-21 (1992) (outlining this perception, the evidence bearing on it, and the legal response).
17
I present this argument in full at II.C, below.
18
See id.
19
Having laid out the general shape of my argument, I owe the reader a word on why I say virtually
nothing about the United States in an article aimed primarily at an American legal audience. The United
States displays none of the trends I discuss here in any neat form. The country’s overall fertility rate is ever
so slightly below the replacement rate, but the population continues to expand because of rapid
immigration that has been relatively uneventful politically. See WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS,
supra n. __ at 71. For the time being, that is, modestly more traditional family practices than Europe’s,
combined with a significantly greater openness to immigration, seem to have enabled the United States to
dodge the demographic bullet. American readers should nonetheless be interested in the argument here for
several reasons: the future of the United State depends on the future of the rest of the world; neither our
openness nor our relative fertility is irreversible; and, more optimistically, something like the American
openness to immigration may be part of an optimistic medium-term to long-term scenario for thirdgeneration biopolitics. I resist simply prescribing that open attitude to relative xenophobic societies in this
article simply because long-distance exhortations to change basic attitudes tend to fall on deaf or resentful
ears. In the meantime, a comparative examination of fertility in the United States and Europe would be
extremely interesting, but would bulk up this article well beyond s reasonable length.
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These troubling paradoxes form the backdrop to a politics that is just beginning to
take shape, which I call third-generation biopolitics. To give an initial definition,
biopolitics concerns the relationship between individuals’ control over their bodies and
the power the political community may exercise over them: both the demands it may
make and the prohibitions it may impose. The crises that give rise to third-generation
biopolitics are a challenge to the premises of an earlier episode, second-generation
biopolitics, which came into its own in the decades after World War Two, and which in
many ways still prevails in the liberal West. Second-generation biopolitics was premised
on two beliefs: first, that reproductive autonomy was part of a liberal definition of
personal freedom that set the normative boundaries of state power; and second, that there
was no essential contradiction between that conception of freedom and the stability of
liberal and democratic politics communities.20 Second-generation biopolitics for its part
repudiated centuries of political thought and practice concerning the relationship between
reproductive decisions and legal order. The premise of first-generation biopolitics was
that the state had a legitimate interest in the reproductive decisions of its people, and
could act to enforce that interest.21 This idea, regarded as obvious for much of history,
became almost taboo after the horrors of World War Two and the eugenics movements in
Europe and the United States.22
The problem third-generation biopolitics confronts is that the second premise of
second-generation biopolitics is now in question: the demographic crises I have sketched
are reminders that reproductive decisions can have systemic consequences in which the
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I describe the characteristics of second-generation biopolitics in much greater detail in III.C, below.
I describe the development of first-generation biopolitics, from Thomas Malthus through a variety of
eugenicist programs, in III.A and III.B, below.
22
See n. 19, supra.
21
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legal order cannot avoid taking an interest. That premise made the commitment to
reproductive autonomy a matter of pure normative principle, not plagued by any stubborn
prudential problems. The challenge for third-generation biopolitics is to assess the
commitment to autonomy in light of the recognition that individual reproductive choices
can have systemic and undesirable political consequences.
I argue that the right response is not to retreat from reproductive autonomy, but
instead to deepen and extend it by ensuring that women exercise alongside
complementary dimensions of autonomy: literacy, workforce participation,
empowerment in household decisionmaking, and capacity to reconcile childrearing and
career. The lesson I draw from the two demographic crises is that a sustainable
commitment to autonomy makes broader demands on the social order than has seemed
clear before now. The commitment to reproductive autonomy should imply commitment
to creating and sustaining conditions in which it is not self-undermining. Evidence from
both Europe and Asia suggests that one variable which both increases fertility rates in
highly developed societies and improves the sex ratio of children in less developed
societies is women’s substantive freedom, the set of choices women available to women
and the range of capabilities they can exercise. In Europe, particularly, increases in
substantive freedom come mainly through social policies that enable women to reconcile
commitment to careers with commitment to childrearing.23 In developing countries,
women’s literacy and workforce participation are the aspects of substantive freedom that
bring improvements in sex ratios. Moreover, there is some suggestive evidence that
women’s substantive freedom works against authoritarian and extremist politics, and so
heads off not just demographic crises, but the political responses that form the proximate
23

The formulation is not gender-neutral; but neither is the social reality.
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threat to reproductive freedom. In all these respects, then, more autonomy rather than
less is the best answer to the threat that autonomy may undermine its own foundations.24
On the one hand, the basic normative commitment of modern politics is to secure
the freedoms of persons: we assess states by how closely they adhere to these principles,
recently to the point of authorizing intervention and overthrow where states are grossly
illiberal and undemocratic. Yet on the other hand, there is no perfect autonomy in
politics, because we are also, inevitably, resources for the state. In order to enforce a
relatively free social order, even a state entirely free of totalitarian ambitions makes
demands on the wealth, the conduct, and the bodies of its citizens. Concentrating here
only on the last – the concern of biopolitics – citizens show up for jury duty; they report
for prison, or are taken there; and, when there is war, they show up to fight and die. Our
role as resources for the state is inevitable because our autonomy depends on the survival
and integrity of the state.
24

This article extends the themes of two previous papers that deal with the relationship between freedom
and property. In the first, I drew on the capabilities-oriented welfare economics of Nobel laureate
economist Amartya Sen and the reform proposals of political economist Hernando de Soto, law professor
Yochai Benkler, and economist Robert Shiller to develop what I called a freedom-promoting approach to
property reform. I argued that property regimes should maximize freedom, defined as capabilities, the
power to make good one’s potential to act along all dimensions of human capacity. I filled out this
prescription by proposing to give priority to two types of capabilities: foundational capabilities on which
many others supervene, such as physical mobility; and meta-capabilities, such as literacy, which enable one
to revise or expand one’s capabilities. In the second article, I enriched this account by developing an
analytics of property regimes as the architecture of social relations, setting the terms on which people
recruit one another to pursue ends ranging from survival and prosperity to more subtle forms of flourishing
such as intimate relationships. The aim of that argument was to take seriously the fact that people’s
capabilities are not monadic: what we can do depends on our power to recruit others to our ends, and on our
susceptibility to others’ recruitment of us. Thus, to understand how a property regime shapes capabilities,
it is necessary to appreciate the relationships of recruitment that it sets up, and so to think of freedom in a
relational manner. The major innovation of that article was the argument that people display a double
character in relations of recruitment. On the one hand, we are resources for one another’s projects, the
objects of their enlistment and deployment. On the other hand, we are all bearers of our own purposes,
wishes, and aims. Property regimes help to define the boundary between the ways others may recruit us as
resources and the ways they are obliged to respect us as ends. The normative kernel of that article was that,
to maximize freedom, property regimes should maximize reciprocity in interpersonal recruitment, so that in
enlisting one another to our aims, we must take account of others’ interests and commitments, and envisage
our own goals relative to theirs. This article extends the picture of people as both autonomous agents and
resources for others’ ends by bringing in the perspective of the state and the imperatives of politics.
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Preserving autonomy therefore requires distinguishing between cases where
personal autonomy and the health of the state are reconcilable and others where they
come into conflict. It is necessary to avoid two kinds of mistakes: on the one hand,
overestimating the necessary extent of state regulation and thus excusing gratuitous
invasions of autonomy; and, on the other hand, underestimating the need for state
regulation and remaining sanguine about uses of autonomy that can produce serious
problems for the state. The challenge of third-generation politics – to reconcile the
commitment to reproductive autonomy with recognition of its systemic political
implications – is a new and important instance of this general problem.
In Part I, I describe in detail the two demographic crises I have already sketched:
the decline of fertility rates to well below replacement level, and a disproportion in
numbers of young women and men already totaling as many as one hundred million in
India and China alone. I emphasize the practical social problems that these trends imply:
the first, a vastly increased ratio of retirees to productive workers, the second a large
population of unmarried young men. In Part II, I discuss the potential implications for
politics of these demographic trends. Declining fertility is historically associated with a
pattern of reactionary politics and particular hostility to women’s equality and
reproductive autonomy, a point I demonstrate with the examples of eighteenth-century
France and Augustan Rome. While there is no significant evidence of such a response in
Europe today, these are relatively early days. Whether or not that pattern holds, declining
fertility rates present societies with a choice between revoking basic features of their
social contracts, particularly adequate public pensions, and massively increasing
immigration. Put differently, that is a choice to give up either of two basic features of
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national identity: the modern welfare state or relative homogeneity. A politics addressed
to that problem cannot but be full of unpalatable alternatives, from nationalism to
intergenerational conflict. Large populations of unmarried men are the prime targets of
nationalist and fundamentalist parties around the world. Moreover, they swell the ranks
of the armed forces and criminal undergrounds, both potentially destabilizing forces in
political crises.
In Part III, I put the discussion in an historical frame. I provide a brief history of
modern biopolitics, beginning with Thomas Malthus and the eugenics movements of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all exemplars of the first-generation premise that
the state had a legitimate interest in reproductive decisions. I then sketch the secondgeneration commitment to autonomy, with its origins in the horrors of the Second World
War and scientistic racism generally, and in the rise of sex equality. Having set up both
the background and the challenges of third-generation biopolitics, I then turn to solutions.
In Part IV, I suggest that novel financial arrangements for international and
intergenerational burden-sharing can mitigate the consequences of declining fertility, and
might greatly diminish them in combination with other responses. In Part V, I move into
the heart of my argument for the value of an enhanced conception of autonomy.
Beginning with Europe, I present evidence suggesting that policies that increase
substantive freedom by enabling women and families to reconcile commitment to work
with the desire to rear children can raise fertility rates toward, if not to, the replacement
level. Turning to India and China, I show that women’s substantive freedom appears to
be the only change that improves sex ratios. In Part VI, I observe admittedly speculative,
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but nonetheless intriguing, reasons to hope that women’s substantive freedom might
directly work against extremist politics. Part VII concludes.

I. Third-Generation Biopolitics: Two Crises
A. The case of sub-replacement fertility
1. Declining fertility rates and rising dependency ratios
For several decades in the last century, many believed that global population
trends pointed ineluctably upward, and that the social and ecological problems of
overpopulation were among the most significant facing the species.25 At the beginning of
the new millennium, the facts began to change rapidly. Global fertility, which in 1950-55
had stood at about 5 children per woman, has fallen to 2.65.26 In 2050 it is projected to
be 2.05 children per woman, slightly below the replacement rate of 2.1.27 According to
the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, this trend would lead to a global population of 9.1 billion by 2050, at which time
growth rates would have slowed considerably and population would be close to leveling
off.28 Estimates premised on a faster decline in fertility rates show population stabilizing
before 2040 and under 8 billion, and beginning to decline by 2050.29
For present purposes, the most interesting question is not global population, but a
pair of subsidiary trends: the geographic distribution of fertility decline and the ratio of
working adults to dependents (children and the retired) in national populations. The
25

See PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION 15-17 (1990)
(arguing that exponential growth in population has set the species on a sure path to exhausting the planet’s
resources); PAUL H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1974) (same).
26
POPULATION NEWSLETTER 79 at 3 (June 2005).
27
Id.
28
WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2004 REVISION vi (2004).
29
Id at vii.
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fertility rate in developed countries now stands at 1.56 children per woman, significantly
below replacement rate.30 Moreover, fertility levels in all the world’s 44 developed
countries except Albania are below replacement rate, and those in 15 countries, mainly in
Southern and Eastern Europe, have fallen below 1.3, a level “unprecedented in human
history.”31 South Korea lies at 1.23, Poland at 1.26, Spain at 1.27, Italy at 1.28, Germany
at 1.32, and Russia and Japan at 1.33.32 Even assuming immigration and a substantial
rebound in fertility rates (partly on the assumption that today’s low levels reflect a
generational decision to delay childbearing rather than reject it outright), these figures
will have such countries’ populations declining in absolute terms between now and 2050:
by more than 30 million in Russia, over seven million in Italy, four million in Germany,
almost 16 million in Japan, and over three million in South Korea.33 The projected
decline for these countries ranges from over 20 percent of today’s population in Russia,
though more than 10 percent for Italy, to around 5 percent in Germany.34
Declining fertility may reflect the economic incentives of a system that expects
parents to absorb most of the cost of raising children (in contrast to retirement, which is
publicly subsidized). According to one recent estimate, the cost of raising a middle-class
child in the United States is over a million dollars in the first seventeen years of life.35
More than eighty percent of that figure comes from forgone parental wages, on the
30

Id.
Id. at viii.
32
Id. at 67-69. By contrast, nine countries with high fertility and immigration rates are expected to account
for more than half the world’s population increase before 2050. These include the political flashpoints of
Pakistan, Nigeria, Congo, and Ethiopia, as well as India and China. The concentration of population
growth in countries with unstable and potentially significant politics is itself an important and troubling
matter, although outside the scope of this Article.
33
Id. at 36-37.
34
I have provided these numbers in round terms because so much uncertainty is absorbed into such
estimates that rough magnitudes are more honest than an exaggerated precision premised on speculation.
35
See PHILIP LONGMAN, THE EMPTY CRADLE:HOW FALLING BIRTHRATES THREATEN
WORLD PROSPERITY (AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT) 73 (2004).
31
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assumption that one parent gives up a $45,000 salary at the time of the child’s birth, and
remains out of the labor market until the child reaches 17, with the opportunity cost in
forgone wages rising to nearly $60,000 by the end of the period.36 These figures may be
somewhat bloated – after all, two-career families are common – but they capture the
outlines of a massive expense.
Declining fertility also appears to reflect changes in values and priorities.
Movement from traditional reproductive and family roles and toward new emphasis on
career, self-expression, and the quality of friendship and romantic relationships all
encourage postponing or skipping marriage and childbearing.37 A study of European
values and family structures reveals that those who have adopted the individualist and
counter-traditional values just enumerated are most likely to be single or involved in
childless cohabitation, while traditionalists are most likely to have entered into
childbearing marriages.38 The same study finds that the timing of European countries’
fertility declines below replacement level corresponds roughly to the timing of this
transformation in values.39 A simpler statistical artifact of this change is a recent poll
finding that, even absent economic constraint, German women on average express a wish
for fewer children than two.40
The effect of declining fertility rates is that, as cohorts age, the proportion of older
to younger people grows. Rising life expectancy amplifies the effect, as relatively large
older populations stick around to keep younger and relatively smaller cohorts company.
36

Id.
See Johan Surkyn & Ron Lesthaeghe, Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition in
Northern, Western, and Southern Europe: An Update, DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH Special Collection
3, at 62-75 (April 17, 2004).
38
Id. at 70-72.
39
Id. at 47-48.
40
See Old Europe, Demographic Change, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 2, 2004).
37
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Thus, while overall global population is projected to increase by about 50 percent before
2050, the number of persons aged 60 years or more is projected almost to triple, from 672
million to nearly 1.9 million.41 In Europe, where this trend is particularly pronounced,
the number of people of pensionable age for every 100 people of working age is
projected to rise from 35 today to 75 in 2050, with one-to-one ratios in Italy and Spain.42
By another estimate, those over 65 in Europe will be equivalent to 60% of the workingage population in 2050.43
The proximate result promises to be a very serious economic drag on countries
already heavily burdened by public debt and slow economic growth. An aging
population means an increase in spending on pensions and health care; a smaller working
population must make a larger per capita contribution to support the retired and the sick.
The European Commission has estimated that such payments may drive up public
spending by five to eight percentage points of GDP by 2040 in the fifteen member
countries of the European Union, crowding out spending on productive investments.44
Declining numbers of workers and reduced capital for investment mean, other things
equal, a fall in economic growth: the International Monetary Fund has estimated that
Europe’s annual growth rate will be a half percentage point lower in 2050 than now – a
number too speculative to be meaningful, but which expresses the certainty that a
shrinking working population putting an increased share of income into transfer
payments cannot be good for growth.45 Taken together, diminished growth and the
redirection of wealth to dependent populations will also crowd out spending on
41

Id. at viii-ix.
See Europe’s Population Implosion, THE ECONOMIST (July 19, 2003).
43
See Half a Billion Americans? – Demography and the West, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 24, 2002).
44
See Old Europe, supra n. 38).
45
See id.
42
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international influence, either via military power or through development assistance to
new members of an expanded Europe and the world’s poorest countries. Summing up
these prospects, the French Institute for International Relations has recently predicted that
Europe faces “a slow but inexorable ‘exit from history.’”46

B. “Bare branches” and sex asymmetry
In this sub-Part I treat the disproportion between men and women in populations
where parents increasingly select for the sex of their children.47 This problem is linked to
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See Europe’s Population Implosion, supra n. 9.
There is considerable debate on the relative proportions of gender disproportion caused by each of a
variety of factors. One class of factors expresses a preference for sons over daughters, exercised at
different points in the cycle of conception and childhood: sex-selective abortion, infanticide, and
preferential caregiving and medical expenditures resulting in higher levels of childhood mortality in girls
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Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural China, 27 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
REVIEW No. 2 at 259 (June 1, 2001) (observing that many Western observers were skeptical that sexdetermination technology was widely available in China, while Chinese scholars resisted the suggestion
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China at 8-10 (unpublished paper: on file with author). As Poston and Glover note, however, Taiwan’s sex
disproportion at birth approaches China, despite near 100 percent reporting and no legal constraint on
fertility, making underreporting seem unlikely to explain the bulk of China’s sex ratio. See id. at 9.
Moreover, although reliable studies of the nominally illegal practices of prenatal sex-determination and
sex-selective abortion are difficult to come by, Junhong Chu’s study of one village in which she had earned
the trust of participants showed high levels of both practices. See Chu, supra (this note) (reporting 39
percent use of ultrasound sex testing during first pregnancies, 55 percent use in second pregnancies, and 67
percent use in additional pregnancies; 27 percent of respondents reported at least one abortion, and 86
percent of that group reported at least one sex-selective abortion). A third candidate is, paradoxically,
improving health overall. Many more male than female fetuses are conceived, but because female fetuses
are hardier than males, the natural proportion at birth only slightly favors males. Hence, other things equal,
an improvement in the health of pregnant women, which decreases the rate of fetal wastage (miscarriages
and stillbirths) should increase the proportion of male fetuses. For this argument, see Dhairiyarayar Jayaraj
& Sreenivasan Subramanian, Women’s Wellbeing and the Sex Ratio at Birth: Some suggestive evidence
from India, 40 J, DEVELOPMENT STUD. No. 5, at 91 (June 1, 2004). Although attractive for its note of
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are presumably much lower than in India or China, do not even approach the sex disproportions registered
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declining fertility by the common structure of third-generation biopolitics: the recognition
that individual reproductive choices have systemic social consequences.

1. The growth of the bare branches
A disproportion of men to women in Asian populations, the result of sex-selective
caregiving, infanticide and, increasingly, abortion, came to widespread attention in 1990,
when the (later Nobel laureate) economist Amartya Sen reported his calculation that,
relative to the natural proportion of male to female births, more than 100 million women
were “missing” worldwide.48 Although subsequent studies have modestly reduced his
estimates (chiefly because he used sub-Saharan African births as a baseline, and the share
of women among births in that population is slightly higher than for other groups),49 the
figures accepted today are dramatic. The natural sex ratio produces a slightly higher
number of women than men in a population.50 By contrast, today’s actual sex ratio in
China shows 106.5 men for each 100 women, and India’s 107.2 men per 100 women.51
(Similar numbers prevail in Pakistan (108.6) and Afghanistan (106.5), and slightly less

in those countries. Political economist Emily Oster has recently drawn attention for her argument that high
rates of hepatitis B contribute to sex disproportion by inducing higher rates of male births and female
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the Missing Women 2-3, Working Paper, Harvard University Center for International Development (2005),
available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/grad_student/007.pdf (visited Feb. 19, 2006). Oster
makes no claim that hepatitis B could account for more than a fraction of the phenomenon. Other
researchers, notably Amartya Sen, have sounded extremely cautious notes about her findings, which
although interesting are far from conclusive. See Eve Conant, What Carried the Girls Away, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE (Feb. 12, 2006) (quoting Sen’s skeptical assessment). On the existing evidence, it is very
difficult to get away from the conclusion that sex-selective abortions and gender bias in childrearing play a
large role in shaping existing sex ratios.
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dramatic figures in Bangladesh (103.8) and Taiwan (104.3)).52 The gap between
expected and actual sex ratios translates to more than 40 million “missing women” in
China’s population of roughly 1.2 billion, and more than 39 million among India’s
roughly one billion people.
Many interwoven factors account for parental sex selection in India: the higher
status attached to male children, the superior earning potential of men over women (with
its corollary, greater capacity to support parents and other family members), and the cost
of providing a bride’s dowry.53 A nationwide study conducted in 1997 found that Indian
parents on average describe a 2:1 ratio of sons to daughters as the optimal mix – a
preference plainly incompatible with natural sex ratios.54 India’s southern states, which
enjoy higher literacy rates than the rest of the country, exhibit the least distortion in their
sex ratios.55 Kerala, with near-universal literacy, many female-headed households, and a
net outmigration of males for work, is unique in having significantly more women than
men in its population, but neighboring Tamil Nadu has a ratio of just over 101 men per
100 women, and Karnataka, home to Bangalore, a ratio somewhat under 104:100.56 The
national sex ratio at birth ranged from 109.8 to 113.8:100 between 1987 and 1998.
Two factors that promote reproductive autonomy appear also to have contributed
to India’s present sex asymmetry. One is the increased availability and decreased cost of
prenatal sex-determination testing and abortion. Between 1982 and 1987 alone, the
number of sex-determination clinics in Bombay rose from 10 to 248.57 Amniocentesis,
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which cost the equivalent of $88 to $117 in the 1980s, now costs $12 to $30 – a lot of
money in a poor country, but also a huge decrease in cost for the poor.58 Ads for sexdetermination testing suggest the cost is worthwhile: “Better 500 rupees now than
500,000 rupees later,” they warn, adverting to the potential cost of a daughter’s dowry.59
Although there is dispute in India over how much of the country’s sex disproportion
arises from abortion and how much from neglect of female infants, the sex bias in
abortion is manifest.60 A Bombay study of 1,000 abortions found 97 percent were of
females (a number that seems implausibly high).61 A study of a hospital in Punjab in the
1980s and 1990s found that 13.6 percent of mothers of boys admitted – with reticence
which may suggest underreporting – having undergone pre-natal sex-selection; the
comparable figure was 2.1 percent for mothers of girls.62 The other female fetuses
presumably were not carried to term.
The second interaction between reproductive autonomy and sex disproportion is
that falling fertility rates, with their connection to increasingly mobile, expressive, and
individualist modes of life, exacerbate sex disproportion.63 Fertility rates have fallen
dramatically in most of India, albeit from a high baseline.64 Monica das Gupta and P.N.
Mari Bhat have found that falling fertility intensifies the pressure for sex selection,
because the total number of children that parents want falls faster than the number of sons
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they desire.65 In consequence, carrying a female infant to term diminishes the chances of
reaching the desired number of sons more dramatically than for a family that wants a
larger number of children overall. Consequently, where both economic interest and
social esteem produce a strong preference for male over female children (or, more
precisely, a preference for a mix of male and female children that falls well off the
biological distribution), the broadly liberalizing trends that produce falling fertility rates
also increase the likelihood of sex-selective abortion and, other things equal, will increase
sexual disproportion.
China is the source of the term “bare branches,” which refers to “surplus men”
who will never be able to marry in countries of “missing women.” As noted, China’s
male-female ratio is 106.5:100, and its “missing women” total about 40 million.66 The
sex ratio for the population overall understates the sex disproportion among the young,
because China’s disproportion has grown a great deal in recent years.67 Official Chinese
publications put the ratio for children under age 5 at 118:100.68 The introduction of
ultrasound technology for pre-natal sex identification in the 1980s seems to have
increased the sex disproportion; an official ban on prenatal sex identification has had
uncertain effects as yet.69 As in India, the preference for sons is powered by esteem, as
sons are higher-status than daughters and are guarantors of family continuity, and by
economic interest, as men are chief wage-earners and, above all, providers for their
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parents’ retirement.70 The government’s notorious one-child policy restricts the number
of births in which families may attempt to reach the desired number of sons.71 The
Chinese setting is thus a striking combination of traditional state coercion and
technologically enabled reproductive autonomy, of authoritarian first-generation
regulatory biopolitics and the new problems of third-generation biopolitics, with no stop
at the autonomy-promoting commitments of second-generation biopolitics.

2. The consequences of sex disproportion
The inevitable consequence of sex disproportion is that, assuming the wish to
marry is at least as frequent in men as in women, there will be many reluctant bachelors.
Hudson and de Boer reckon conservatively that by 2020 China will be home to between
29 million and 33 million “surplus males” between the ages of 15 and 34.72 Their
estimates for India range between 28 and 32 million bare branches.73 Even in the
conservative range, these numbers raise the prospect of more than fifty million young
men in the world’s most populous countries, who will be unable to enter adulthood by the
usual integrating route of marriage and fatherhood.
What is a large population of unmarried young men likely to mean? There are
several parts to the answer. First, unmarried men are statistically likely to belong to the
lowest socioeconomic classes, to be underemployed or unemployed, and to be relatively
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transient because of both their need to move for work and their lack of family-based
community ties.74 Second, without the usual means of entering settled society, they tend,
according to historical sociologists, to associate with other bachelors in loose societies of
laborers, transients, adventurers, or ne’er do wells.75 The sub-cultures that develop in
these groups are particularly prone to drug and alcohol abuse, violence, norms of extreme
sensitivity to insult, and risk-taking behavior of all sorts.76 Third, unless they move into
monastic or other orders that provide social integration without marriage, bare branches
maintain a relatively alienated attitude toward settled society, and sometimes fall into an
oppositional and opportunistically predatory stance. Hudson and de Boer follow a
number of historical scholars in suggesting that “surplus males” seeking outlets for
ambition and energy populated Chinese and Indian bandit troops, freelance Chinese
armies that spurred disastrous rebellions, and Portuguese rogue aristocrats who preyed on
peasants and led expansionary overseas adventures.77
These general claims appear to line up with present reality in India and China.
Amartya Sen has observed that inter-regional contrasts in India reveal “a strong – and
statistically very significant – relation between the female-male ratio in the population
74
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and the scarcity of violent crimes.”78 Although the precise figures are debated, millions
of Chinese are transient, semi-employed, semi-legal laborers known as the “floating
population,” thought to be 70-80 percent male and largely unmarried.79
In this Part, I have summarized two unsettling demographic trends: declining
fertility and increasingly unequal sex ratios. Both have systemic and troubling
consequences: respectively, rising dependency rates and stresses on public pension
systems and unmarriageable male populations lacking clear paths to settled and
productive adulthood. I now turn to the specifically political consequences of these
trends.

II. Demographic Crisis and Political Threat
A. The pattern of pro-natalist politics
Declining fertility, or the perception of declining fertility, is not new, even if it
has never been so widespread or dramatic as it is now. In past episodes, an unsettling
pattern has recurred. Pro-natalist agitators have identified culture, values, or preferences
– pick your vocabulary – as the source of declining fertility, and issued polemics against
them. Pro-natalist polemicists tend to favor a homogenous, hierarchical, and “virtuous”
version of national community. This form of pro-natalist politics has consistently
identified the moral health of the political community with its fertility rate. It has
consequently picked out three principles as diseases on the body politic: any form of
individualism, with its stress on personal satisfaction and development over reproduction;
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pluralism, the acknowledgement of valid forms of life that do not honor family and
reproduction foremost; and, above all, women’s equality.
I give two historical instances, one from Imperial Rome, the other from
eighteenth-century France. In Rome in the age of the emperor Augustus, a widespread
perception arose that the Roman elite was failing to reproduce itself,. In this polemical
view, elites preferred sensual indulgence to childbearing, and pursued that preference
through refusal to marry, contraception, abortion, exposure (abandonment) of newborns,
and infanticide.80 Augustus responded with a decree directing each citizen to produce at
least three children and granting certain benefits to those who met this standard while
punishing the unmarried and the childless with penalties such as restrictions on their right
to inherit.81 This state claim on the reproductive capacity of the citizenry was
accompanied by a genre of declensionist polemics, complaining that the once virile and
fecund Roman people had become effeminate, self-indulgent, and infertile.82 The attack
was not only on self-indulgent men, but also on increasingly autonomous upper-class
women, whose wealth and legal rights gave them a measure of control over reproductive
decisions, which they pressed to the hilt, collaborating with or perhaps overcoming their
husbands in declining to bear children.83 The polemical target was thus male
individualism, but also the relative emancipation of female citizens, which enabled them
to participate in some of the same individualist norms as their male counterparts.
80
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Eighteenth-century France recapitulated the Roman pattern. For much of the
eighteenth century it was widely believed that France was losing population. (In fact, the
opposite was true, mostly because mortality rates were falling, but shrinking family sizes
and the beginning of rural emigration to towns and cities produced the impression of a
desolated land.84) Picking up ancient tropes linking the virtue of kings to the fertility of
their people, critics of the monarchy seized on the perceived fertility collapse for
polemical advantage.85 Philosophes and republicans developed sociological attacks on
the king, arguing against values and behavior that supposedly undercut fertility, which
they associated with wealthy and aristocratic allies of the monarchy.86 Most frequent
objects of attack were “libertines,” aristocratic men who, like their Roman predecessors,
preferred the wealth, freedom, and episodic sexual gratification of a bachelor (and
sometimes a “sodomite”) existence to the duties of fatherhood.87 In the years before the
French Revolution, “the language employed to denounce celibacy became increasingly
harsh, the proposals more Draconian.”88
This critique crystallized in an assault on “luxury,” a line of attack shared by the
Marquis de Mirabeau, the abbe Charles-Andre-Alexandre de Moy, and the conservative
Melchior Grimm, among many others.89 In this account, “luxury” stood for a preference
for social standing and the pleasures of consumption and self-cultivation over the
expenses and burdens of childrearing.90 Mirabeau proposed a graduated tax luxury
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consumption to redirect resources from pleasure and display to production and
reproduction.91 Georges-M. Butel-Dumont contended in 1771 that the state must go
farther and punish those who remained unmarried.92 Another polemicist argued, “if it is
illegal to commit suicide because that means robbing the Fatherland of oneself, it should
be all the more so to stay single [because] each citizen is obliged to contribution … his
share of [the nation’s] perpetuation.”93 As in imperial Rome, these proposals envisaged a
direct and powerful claim of the state on the reproductive capacity of the individual
citizen and embraced authoritarian, even proto-totalitarian regulation to enforce the
claim.94
A reactionary gender politics accompanied the French pro-natalist agenda. One
polemical target was the alleged effeminacy of wealthy and especially aristocratic men,
portrayed as wigged, made-up, mincing, and clad in silk.95 Another was the autonomy of
upper-class women who, presumably under the influence of luxurious appetites, avoided
childbearing to preserve themselves for other pleasures. The pro-natalist Mirabeau
described a flighty and self-indulgent new mother of a first child, a daughter, who
declares of her disinclination to take on another pregnancy: “the job is dreadful, and I
don’t feel like sacrificing myself for my posterity.”96 Such gender-specific polemics
have particularly ominous political implications. There is something totalitarian about
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insisting on a woman’s duty to reproduce. The literal occupation of a woman’s body by
the child in utero and the substantial hazard of childbearing (particularly before the
advent of modern medicine) both give pro-natalist legislation an aspect of intimate
coercion.97
The French Revolution carried many of these polemical themes into political
struggle and legislation. When the laws of 13-19 February, 1790 abolished clerical vows
of chastity, the speaker of the Assembly declared that the country could no longer tolerate
infertile celibacy “for reasons both moral and demographic … there are 100,000 young
women who must be married.”98 Legislative assaults on the infertile laity were less
decisive, but pro-natalist policies accompanied severe rhetoric. A decree of 1791 took
the tack of today’s pro-natalist incentives, reducing personal taxes on the fathers of more
than three children.99 The post-Terror constitution of 1795 excluded the abstentious from
the highest levels of government, providing that “no one may be elected to the Conseil de
Anciens … unless he is married or widowed,” that is, unless he had made a good-faith
effort to join the chain of social reproduction.100 The deputy Louis Depuy announced,
“The citizen is the property of the Fatherland and a part of its wealth,” a radical extension
of the premises of first-generation biopolitics, and urged that childless unions be declared
invalid.101 Another deputy, Charles F. Bouche, denounced all unmarried persons as
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“parasites, in general corrupt or corrupting … a useless weight on the face of the
earth.”102
I have selected two examples remote from each other and from the present
because they represent a recurrent ideological pattern in pro-natalist politics. An actual
or perceived decline in fertility draws attention to values and practices that take people
away from reproduction: pluralism, individualism, polemically portrayed as decadence,
luxury, and effeminacy, and women’s empowerment. The new visibility of nonreproductive ways of living raise the possibility that repopulation from generation to
generation is not automatic, that fertility depends on a culture that honors reproduction
and laws that reward it. Two responses are typical. First is a new assertion of an explicit
state interest in reproductive choices. Reproduction is now styled a political as well as a
natural duty, and the citizen or subject is sometimes portrayed as the property of the state,
a part of its stock of natural resources. Second is an assault – polemical at the most
modest – on non-reproductive cultural forms: luxury, individualism, and any sexual
practice that does not produce offspring. This way of asserting the priority of state or
social interests over individual choice in intimate matters gives pro-natalist politics an
affinity with modern forms of authoritarian and totalitarian politics, particularly the
fascist apotheosis of the nation.
There is not significant evidence that this pattern is recurring in any important
way in Europe or Japan today. I suggest later that this may be partly a consequence of
women’s well-established equality, partly a result of continuing revulsion at the eugenic
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policies of the last century.103 These are early days, however, and it would be naïve to
imagine that the same political pattern could not recur as the effects of declining fertility
become increasingly palpable. Other connections between demographic crisis and
illiberal politics, while less richly instanced in history, are less speculative today.

B. The Politics of Pensions and Immigration
An obvious response to the increase in dependency rations is to increase
immigration of working-age adults, permitting them to stand in for the “absent” nativeborn adults of a population with sub-replacement fertility levels. This option, however,
would likely set in motion a political crisis. Immigration on a scale that would prevent
dependency ratios from rising would be much greater than developed countries have so
far embraced. According to a United Nations estimate, Germany would need to admit
3.6 million immigrants per year between now and 2050, against a baseline of roughly 80
million inhabitants, to keep dependency rates constant. 104 The corresponding figure
would be even more dramatic in countries such as Italy, Spain, and Japan, where a
substantial decline in absolute population is now projected.105
The numerical challenge is the least of the difficulties attending immigration.
Germany and the rest of Europe have been politically fractured over current immigration
levels, which are too small to make much of a dent in their dependency ratios. In light of
these political constraints, the Rand Corporation’s European division has concluded that
public policy needed to focus on influencing domestic fertility because “[t]he sheer
numbers of immigrants that are needed to prevent population ageing [sic] in the EU and
103
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its Member States are not acceptable in the current socio-political climate prevailing in
Europe,” a judgment that considerably preceded the politically explosive riots among
France’s North African immigrants in fall of 2005.106
Policymakers confront two other options, neither one politically attractive. First
is a substantial increase in the age of eligibility for public pensions, or a harsh cut in the
level of pension benefits. While such reform has succeeded on the margins, particularly
in the United States, any changes that approached offsetting the increased cost from
demographic change would likely be political dynamite. The recent stillbirth of Social
Security reform even in the relatively market-oriented United States, in a time of
conservative ascendancy, suggests the difficulty of revising this class of entitlements.107
So does the long-running German stalemate between the Christian Democrats and the
Social Democrats, which has so far blocked any serious reform of that country’s disasterbound welfare-spending commitments.108
Increased immigration has thus emerged as a visible option in discussions of
fertility decline, not so much to point the way to a solution as to highlight the newly
paradoxical relationship between two aspects of national identity in Europe and Japan:
social solidarity in the form of a generous welfare policy, and the expectation of ethnic
homogeneity. It was an implicit premise of those countries’ welfare policies that benefits
would go to people with whom taxpayers identified – a pattern of ethno-national
spending that neared perfection in West Germany’s nearly overwhelming decision to
106
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absorb the former East Germany into its welfare state. It now begins to seem that nothing
like the current level of social support can continue unless Europe gives up even today’s
relative homogeneity in favor of becoming a continent of immigrant societies. To take
that path, though, would force the question of whether welfare-state solidarity could
survive absent ethno-national solidarity, or whether the continent’s transformation by
immigration would transform its political cultures into less solidaristic, more laissez-faire
societies. The second option would push European countries in the direction of the
United States, where relatively open immigration co-exists with minimal entitlements, so
that the country takes on a low burden of solidarity, whether measured in fiscal
obligations or in collective identification, by admitting foreigners.
The politics in which this question got worked out would be concerned centrally
with the place of large immigrant populations in a time when sacrosanct expressions of
social solidarity are increasingly unaffordable. That politics would inevitably interact
with existing rifts over the place of immigrants in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
other European countries. Although forecasting specific developments in political
cultures is usually a fruitless game, particularly across an ocean and at the scale of
continents, a crisis of solidarity and ethno-national identity suggests a perfect storm for
reactionary conceptions of the national community as ethnically homogeneous, superior
in virtue, and under threat in its defining traditions and character. These themes have
plenty of pernicious potential in themselves: they also point back toward the kind of
reactionary criticism of unorthodox sub-cultures and empowered women as drags on
national virtue and fertility – and thus, by way of falling fertility and rising dependency
ratios, the source of the whole problem in the first place.
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This is a speculative discussion, but not a wildly imaginative one. The most
fractious themes of Europe’s domestic politics are immigration and the future of the
welfare state. Both raise charged questions about the nature of national community: who
“we” are, what we owe one another, and what the two questions have to do with each
other. Fertility decline brings the two issues face to face in a manner that may tend to
make ideas of national community more rigid and reactionary at the very moment that
practical exigencies make national populations more heterogeneous.

C. Sex disproportion and politics
The most interesting and novel question to arise from sex disproportion is what it
will mean for the very important political transitions that China and India are now
undergoing. In a time when “the future of Western political theory will be decided
outside the West,” the development of electoral democracy in India, democratic-tending
reform in China, and market institutions in both countries is of great moment.109 Stakes
are high for the well-being of the more than two billion people who inhabit those
countries, for the geo-political order they will either anchor or disrupt, and – as the quote
just given suggests – for the future of the very institutional forms China and India are
now pursuing and revising.
The first possible consequence concerns women’s status in society. To the extent
that gender equality is a normative aim of liberal and democratic institutions and an
empirical contributor to the development of these institutions, resurgent gender hierarchy
is bad for political development.110 Unhappily, sex disproportion can be bad for
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women’s status. As women become relatively scarce, men increase competition to
control them, which tends to produce early marriage, high levels of direct discipline of
women by men, and, for the most vulnerable women, increased levels of kidnapping, sale
as brides, and prostitution.111 Although a formalist trained in the rudiments of economics
might imagine the contrary consequence – that increased demand for women relative to
supply would increase the bargaining power of the women themselves – a bit of realist
reflection reveals the problem.112 Scarcity increases bargaining power only when women
are recognized as formal equals in bargaining, or at least are practically able to withhold
the resources they control. When the holder of the resource – in this case, a woman’s
own person – cannot withhold it because of legal disability or material vulnerability, an
increase in the value of the resource means a greater chance that she will be coerced into
giving it up. Thus there may be an unhappy relationship between sex disproportion and
resurgent hierarchy in gender relations where, as in both India and China, women’s
positions are already subordinate and vulnerable.113
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The second possible consequence is the rise of potentially anti-democratic and
illiberal institutions, either to absorb populations of unmarried men or to address the antisocial behavior associated with such men. The military is the foremost public institution
suited to absorb unmarried populations; a large and restive military is also both an
independent political actor with potentially anti-democratic goals. These goals may or
may not extend to coups or other overt power struggles. They may well include pressure
for destabilizing adventures that demonstrate – for reasons of both funding and status –
the importance of the military. The potential for overt power struggles exists in
government made vulnerable by the uncertainties of political reform, as China seems
likely increasingly to be; the potential for dangerous adventurism is manifest in China’s
relations with Taiwan and India’s with Pakistan.
Domestic police forces are also likely to grow in response to unmarried male
populations. China announced in 1999 that it would substantially increase the size of the
People’s Armed Force, which is charged with maintaining internal stability by quelling
unrest, protest, and rioting.114 The increase was a response to labor and political unrest,
some of it associated with the transient “floating” population. Interestingly, unmarried
men may be the members of the People’s Armed Force as well as its targets: the new
recruits have been described as “the dregs” of society, many of them with petty criminal
backgrounds.115 Any armed locus of authority, particularly one that works at the
intersection of ordinary law-and-order and political repression, can easily pose a danger
to liberal and democratic political development.
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The most difficult question, and the most potentially troubling, is whether
unmarried young men are particularly likely recruits for nationalist movements and other
extremist politics, and particularly for the violent or para-military wings of these
movements. India has been plagued by such organizations, mostly Hindu nationalists,
since before its independence in 1947: the Shiv Sena, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,
and others, have been responsible for religious massacres, harassment of both minorities
and religiously tolerant governments, and one of the founding wounds of Indian politics,
the assassination of Mohandas Gandhi.116 While political movements are tightly
controlled in China, nationalism stands alongside economic growth as a pillar of the
present government’s legitimacy, and ultra-nationalist sentiment is known to be strong
among many young Chinese.117 The role that ultra-nationalists would play in a Chinese
political crisis cannot be more than object of speculation; but it could hardly be good for
liberal democracy.
Take the case of the Shiv Sena, whose career in Mumbai and the surrounding
state of Maharashtra combines nationalist rhetoric, street-fighting ethnic self-assertion,
social-service provision and community-building.118 Young men, particularly those who
face limited employment prospects in the migrant slums of Mumbai, make up the
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organizational core of the party and the bulk of its militants.119 Membership in
nationalist organizations addresses several of the needs described in the earlier
sociological sketch of the characteristics of populations of unmarried men.120 In material
terms, nationalist groups offer an opportunity for economic advancement, chiefly through
patronage and participation in organized crime, particularly extortion, to young men who
tend to fare poorly in the legitimate economy.121 In social terms, nationalist
organizations provide community centers, shared activity, and an environment of
solidarity in which those who are blocked from other modes of social integration, such as
marriage and employment, can enjoy belonging and recognition in their otherwise
unattached status.122 Ideologically and as a matter of political psychology, nationalism
provides an abstract community – the nation – with which those otherwise socially
displaced can identify emotionally; moreover, violent nationalism assigns these young
men an honored role: warriors, the defenders of a nation in which, without nationalist
ideology, they might lack any substantial place.123 In this respect, nationalism at once
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valorizes the particularly violent terms of status in populations of unmarried men and
proposes to integrate that group-specific status into a position of honor within the
national community. In an irony that is at once poignant and unsettling, nationalist
ideology sometimes places special emphasis on the warrior’s role as a defender of the
nation’s womanhood, particularly against the depredations of an internal alien, such as
India’s Muslims; men who lack erotic, affective, and social ties with actual women are
thus invited to imagine themselves the protectors of the nation’s femininity.124

III. A Brief History of Biopolitics
In addressing conjoined demographic crises and political threats, the world is not
writing on a blank slate. The effort to formulate a political response – a third-generation
biopolitics – must contend with the morally troubling legacy of centuries of history. In
this Part I survey that history and its implications for a contemporary biopolitics.125
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The French obsession with fertility as an expression of national vitality or decline,
the fruit of the king’s just rule and a barometer of virtue and vice in the population, began
as part of an old tradition of magical association between fertility and the health of the
realm. By the decades following the French Revolution, however, that obsession had
become a policy aim steering the regulatory apparatus of the early-modern state. This
aim was premised on the main idea of the first hundred and fifty years of biopolitics,
what I call the First Generation: that citizens and subjects were in good part resources for
the nation, and that like any important resource, they merited appropriate regulation in
the national interest. With the end of the Second World War and the rise of new attention
to reproductive autonomy, this premise came into disrepute, replaced by the main idea of
Second Generation biopolitics: reproductive decisions belong to those who make them,
and any legitimate interest of the state lies in public morality and the well-being of
individual citizens, not the maintenance of a pool of material resources composed of
living human bodies. The problems of Third Generation biopolitics emerge against the
backdrop of the repudiation of the First Generation and the rise of the Second Generation.

A. Thomas Malthus and Demographic Pessimism
Thomas Malthus enjoys the rare distinction of having bequeathed his name to a
view of the world, one premised on the application to human beings of a putative
biological principle: “the constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the
nourishment prepared for it.”126 He applied this principle to human beings in the form of
a simple and grim cycle in demographics and economics. Whenever wages (or other
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income) rose high enough to support fertility above the replacement rate, human beings
responded with offspring.127 A rising population meant a larger workforce, which drove
down wages to the point of privation, even starvation.128 “The poor,” Malthus wrote,
“consequently must live much worse, and many of them be reduced to severe distress.”129
The distressed poor would be unable to afford to marry or bring their children alive
through infancy, which would induce a fall in population.130 This in turn would drive
wages high enough to support reproduction at or above the replacement rate, beginning
the grim cycle again.131
Although he is nowadays remembered in intellectual shorthand as a pessimist
who failed to appreciate that rising productivity would enable a finite world to feed many
more people than it once could, Malthus was very much a practitioner of demographic
politics.132 The son of a radical minister who had embraced the French Revolution as an
emblem of the promise of human improvement, Malthus turned sharply against his
father’s political optimism.133 His argument is very much about the limits of politics; he
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argued relentlessly that unyielding tendencies in human nature severely constrained the
power of political reform to improve human circumstances.134
Malthus did concede that human reproduction differs from that of other species
because people make self-conscious decisions in accord with plans of life.135 He referred
to “preventive checks” on population as unique to humans, while “positive checks,”
forming the cycle of overreach and privation sketched above, held for all forms of life.136
He classified the uniquely human “preventive checks” into “moral restraint,” meaning
celibacy or at least continence, and “vice,” which included all “irregular gratifications” of
the sexual desire, all of which he regarded as degrading to human dignity and especially
to female character.137 He does not seem to have regarded vice as an appropriate goal of
public policy. He treated moral restraint as a product of gradual increases in individual
virtue, expressing doubt that even education in his demographic principles would
persuade the poor to limit their reproduction.138
Malthus’s polemical targets were visionary reformers. The thrust of his argument
was that neither redistribution of wealth nor other reform in the economic or political
order could improve the human lot, because by inducing the poor to reproduce faster,
they would only intensify the cycle of expansion and privation. Malthus thus devoted a
great deal of his Essay to deriding the programs of socialist reformers, including the
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Marquis de Condorcet and Robert Godwin, and to attacking England’s laws for support
of the poor as futile.139 The more ambitious the reform, the greater the burst in fertility
and the immiseration that would follow.140 Moreover, under conditions of want, an
egalitarian allocation of property would give way to resurgent proletarianism as hungry
laborers succumbed to hard bargains: soon enough, the division between workers and
owners would be restored, however visionary the plan of reform that had sought to
replace it.141
Thus Malthus drew from his demographic principles a lesson of political
quietism. He concluded,
That the principal and most permanent cause of poverty has little or no relation to
forms of government, or the unequal division of property; and that, as the rich do
not in reality possess the power of finding employment and maintenance for the
poor, the poor cannot, in the nature of things, possess the right to demand them,
are important truths flowing from the principle of population[.]142
The purpose of his argument was thus “less … to propose new plans of improving
society, than to inculcate the necessity of resting contented with that mode of
improvement which is dictated by the course of nature,” that of incremental individual
growth in the virtue of self-restraint.143
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B. The Vicissitudes of Human “Improvement”
The marriage of demographic science and policy science which Malthus proposed
became the core of first-generation biopolitics, although usually with more robust aims
than Malthus’s, which were mainly proscriptive. Throughout the nineteenth century and
into the twentieth, the premises remained that (1) individual reproductive decisions had a
substantial effect on the national interest and (2) policy decisions could legitimately take
account of this interest in seeking to influence or dictate reproductive patterns.
As early as the opening decades of the nineteenth century, English reformers
concerned to ameliorate the severe conditions of the industrial working class had married
Malthus’s belief that overpopulation caused poverty to a non-Malthusian confidence that
scientific progress could induce rapid improvements in well-being.144 These reformers
broke with Malthus’s identification of birth control as “vice,” taking it instead as a
critical instrument of progress.145 In the following decades, American utopians such as
those in New York’s Oneida community attempted new modes of sexual regulation,
including “male continence” (which depended on refraining from ejaculation, and would
certainly have struck Malthus as “vice”) and “stirpiculture,” an Oneida eugenic practice
aimed at improving the race by both selective breeding and innovative childrearing.146
Later in the century, biopolitics became linked to a less communitarian and more statist
utopian program that anticipated full-blown racialist eugenics. Operating without a wellgovernment, and that slow melioration of the condition of the lower classes of society, which are
really obtainable. Id. at 253.
144
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founded genetic account of inheritance, reformers connected the qualities of children with
the state of mind of the parents at conception, and thus argued for loosening or abolishing
marriage laws to produce children born of love, not duty, who would accordingly display
superior moral qualities.147 More systematically, radicals of the post-Civil War period
argued that increasing equality for women would “improve the race” along all
dimensions, as women with power over their reproductive choices would (1) have fewer
children to avoid the risk to health and life of childbearing; (2) choose fathers with an eye
to the genetic patrimony of their children; and (3) conceive and bear children in a state of
mind that would produce good qualities in offspring.148
At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, biopolitics
turned toward the anti-immigrant and white-supremacist eugenics that persists in
infamy.149 Demographers warned that falling birth rates among native-born, and
especially educated, white Americans, coupled with the high fertility of immigrant
groups, could result in the complete replacement of the first population by the second.150
Sounding anti-feminist (as well as pro-natalist) themes from pre-Revolutionary France
and even Augustan Rome, the enemies of “race suicide” assailed educated and wealthy
women, whom statistics showed to be slow breeders, and warned that women’s
participation in the workforce detracted from their roles as wives and mothers.151
President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 attacked women who avoided having children as
“criminal against the race … the object of contemptuous abhorrence by healthy
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people.”152 Across the Atlantic, the same anti-feminist and anti-decadence themes
sounded in the Germany of World War One, where the importance of healthy bodies as a
national resource came to the fore in the long slaughter of trench warfare.153 Much the
same response followed World War One in France, where in 1920 the Chamber of
Deputies overwhelmingly passed an anti-contraceptive measure, an emblem of both the
“almost universal support” for pro-natalist values and “the new willingness of the French
state to legislate on its behalf.”154
However pernicious were the eugenicist programs that preceded World War Two,
the slide of scientific and pseudo-scientific demographic policy into genocide marks a
horrific rupture in history and conscience, which needs no rehearsal here. The
aggressively pro-natalist nationalism of Nazi policy was part and parcel of the
eliminationist hatred toward “non-Germans” and “non-Aryans,” particularly Jews. As
the West struggled to absorb the crimes of the world’s most literate and scientifically
advanced country, talk of “race suicide,” of improving the national stock, of the duty to
produce for the nation, all took on aspect of the criminal, torrid fascist fantasy of ethnic
sameness, of a nation without strangers. In retrospect, there was horror hidden (or not so
hidden) in the pragmatic defenses of German sterilization policy in the American
eugenicist Eugenical News; the matter-of-fact transmission of German eugenicist claims
about Jewish rates of inherited disorders in the Journal of American Medicine;155 and
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s pronouncement in Buck v. Bell that “three generations
of imbeciles is enough.”156 After such knowledge, what forgiveness? There was little for
the idea that the physical health of the national community, conceived in racial terms or
in the imagery of fertility and virility, could be anything other than a marker along the
way to totalitarianism.

C. Second-Generation Biopolitics: The turn to autonomy
The end of the Second World War ushered in a set of changes that moved
biopolitics decisively away from the conception of persons as state resources and instead
made reproductive choice a basic dimension of a new conception of autonomy, one based
in keeping the state out of judgments of conscience and decisions about intimate
relations. One overwhelming negative motive drove this change: horror at what eugenic
politics had wrought in Naxi Germany. The change also had several affirmative sources,
which developed partly in response to eugenic totalitarianism and genocide. One was the
rise of international human-rights culture, with its universalist commitment to securing
individuals against state abuses.157 Another was the women’s movement, wihich brought
trans-Atlantic and eventually global demands for women’s equal social, economic, and
political participation, and which whose leaders and members were almost uniformly
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committed to reproductive autonomy. 158 A third, specific to the United States, was the
turn of the Constitutional jurisprudence of personal autonomy from the Lochner-era
concern with rights of property and contract in a Free-Labor economy to the post-New
Deal emphasis on securing the individual conscience and life-path, including choices
about childbearing and intimate relations.159 A final and critically important factor,
which produced a massive increase in reproductive choice even where autonomy-based
principles of sexual equality were weak or nearly absent, was the advent and diffusion of
inexpensive and effective contraceptive technology, which greatly increased the degree
of choice in conception independent of abortion rights; similar developments in abortion
technology increased the real capacity of women to control childbearing even where
abortion remained illegal, and considerably increased the efficacy of the right to abortion
where it was protected.160
The implicit empirical supposition in the era of reproductive autonomy is that
individual reproductive choices do not produce aggregate results in which the state has a
158
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(surveying incidence and safety levels of abortion worldwide).
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legitimate interest sufficient to justify coercive reproductive policy. Justice Jackson’s
famous observation that the Constitution is not a suicide pact implies an empirical
judgment about the operation of fundamental rights: that in the vast majority of
circumstances, individual autonomy will be compatible with the political governance,
economic operation, military security, and intergenerational reproduction of the polity.161
The prominence of reproductive autonomy in second-generation biopolitics, similarly,
supposes that reproductive choice is not a demographic suicide-pact.162 The two trends
that this article has explored, population decline and sex disproportion, present a basic
challenge to the coherence and viability of second-generation biopolitics: the possibility
that individual reproductive decisions produce aggregate results with serious
consequences for the well-being of the entire polity.
Having laid out the historical background to today’s biopolitics, I now turn to the
first of two discussions of partial but promising solutions. In the next Part, I argue that
novel financial arrangements can make possible intergenerational burden-sharing on the
international level to make up some of the demographic asymmetries produced by
declining fertility within countries while avoiding the political hazards of achieving the
same benefits through immigration. This approach may provide some help in threading
the needle I described earlier in III.B: the unhappy conjunction of two crises in the
161

For a discussion of how changing facts may alter the balance among competing principles and pare back
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European and Japanese ideas of solidarity, the first a financial crisis in the welfare state
and the second a threat to the ethnic homogeneity that social solidarity has long
presupposed.
Before starting this discussion, I should note that I do not admire ethnic
homogeneity as a basic of national identity: quite the contrary. I propose a way to save
parts of the European and Japanese models of social solidarity because the alternative
may be worse, and because I believe solidarity is a value worth carrying forward into a
more heterogeneous world. Changing everything at once brings risks better avoided; one
of the major aims of public policy should be to affect the direction and sequence of
sweeping changes to preserve the good that they endanger while taking advantage of the
good potential that they bring. My proposal in the next Part is in that spirit.

IV. Intergenerational and International Burden-Sharing: The First Line of
Engagement
As noted earlier, Europe and other regions with declining populations could
supplement their adult workforce and thus shore up the age-ratio that keeps public
pensions viable, by permitting increased migration from the world’s poorer countries.163
Yet his idea is politically unpalatable and probably unviable in most European polities,
let alone xenophobic Japan; in both hemispheres, hostility toward foreigners and
skepticism about the possibility of integrating newcomers politically and culturally lines
have produced calls for new immigration restrictions, the opposite of what fiscal
solvency would require.164 While there have also been calls for opening international
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labor markets, they have come mostly from commentators on the far left, and have had
little traction among mainstream students of international relations, let alone politicians
and voters.165 The political impediments to this response to population contraction raise a
variation on an earlier question: Is the nation-state a suicide pact? Does policing national
borders to maintain relative homogeneity make a modern welfare state unsustainable
when population is declining?
A novel form of fiscal policy offers a chance to achieve some of the benefits of
labor migration without absorbing its political cost. While at best only a partial and
experimental response, and somewhat different in emphasis from my main argument
about the importance of increasing substantive autonomy, it has enough promise and
relevance to deserve a place in this discussion, even if mostly as a conversation-starter.166
The model, proposed by Yale economist Robert Shiller, rests on the new technological
viability of complex contracts for the sharing of risk and benefit across large populations
over time.167 The general form of Shiller’s proposal concerns the implications of new
data-gathering and information-management technologies for risk-pooling.168 Pooling
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risk through private and social insurance is, of course, one of the great advances of
modern economic life, enabling individuals to diffuse losses that would otherwise be
financially devastating by replacing the risk of massive costs that one must bear oneself
with a probability-discounted periodic or lump-sum payment in the form of an insurance
premium. Notoriously, however, insurance is dogged by moral hazard, the tendency of
individuals who can externalize the costs of their actions to behave in riskier ways than
they otherwise would, whether by driving recklessly or, where the insurance is income
support, by accepting unemployment and collecting checks. Shiller proposes that
collection and aggregation of data for the entire sector or region of the economy in which
the insured participates, rather than the individual’s employment status or income, can
enable an insurer to differentiate between losses that reflect sectoral changes beyond the
individual’s control and others that are merely local to the individual: in a scheme of
income support based on such data, payments would be based not on individual income,
but on whether the average income of sector participants had fallen below a specified
baseline.
The data index that Shiller proposes to solve the moral hazard problem for income
insurance provide the basis for what Shiller calls “macro-markets,” effectively index
funds that would make possible investment in entire economic sectors or even national
economies. He envisions, for instance, an agreement between nations to share portions of
their GDP to compensate for performance above or below a specified baseline of
expectation, making possible some hedging against even national-level economic
downturns.169 These would not be charitable arrangements, but self-interested contracts
aimed blunting the edge of bad luck. One can imagine, for instance, the benefits to
169
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regional stability of a contract that would have given Argentina’s and Indonesia’s
governments a share of China’s booming national income during the disastrous financial
contractions those countries experienced at the turn of the millennium – as one can
imagine the appeal to all parties of entering into such an agreement ex ante, when none
knew which would experience a short-term fiscal crisis and which a continuing
expansion.170
The concept of macro-markets for international agreements has potential
application to the fiscal crises of demographic contraction. Labor migration – the
solution Europe, Japan, and Korea are likely to resist for political and cultural reasons –
is an individual response to differences in wage rates (adjusted for cost of living,
availability of employment, and so forth) across nations. These rates, in turn, reflect the
ratio of labor to capital in each economy, with high-capital countries paying more for
relatively scarce labor, and plentiful labor taking low wages in relatively low-capital
countries.171 In a borderless world where the cost of migration were zero, populations of
workers would rearrange themselves – as capital has already begun to do – until a single,
global average wage emerged for each occupation.172 Liberalization of international
labor markets would allow workers in low-wage countries to take advantage of high
European wages, with some dragging effect on European wage rates, but also with the
more-than offsetting benefit of increasing the population of workers paying into
170
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Germany’s social-pension system. The question is whether a complex international
financial arrangement might take advantage of the same differential without moving
bodies across borders.
Imagine a contract of this form. The governments of Germany, Japan, the
European Union, or all of these commit for a period of two decades to subsidize public
investments in education, public-health, and infrastructure in India and China. In return,
the Indian and Chinese governments commit a share of their future GDP’s, roughly from
the decades of working life of the cohorts that benefit from the rich countries’ payments,
to the governments of the investor countries. These payments will subsidize the public
pension plans of the investor countries when their “missing” workers (those not born
under a sub-replacement birthrate) would otherwise have been contributing payroll taxes
to the national fisc.
These contracts would take advantage of the same the same resource differentials
that drive labor mobility. The developing countries are rich in population, particularly
young population, relative to their supply of capital for health and education to raise the
value of their rising cohorts. The rich countries, by contrast, are rich in capital but
relatively poor in population, particularly the working population of the coming
generation. Under the contract envisioned here, the rich countries’ capital would help
prepare the next working generation in labor-rich and capital-poor countries for
productive careers. In return, workers in the latter countries would effectively become
payors into the public pension systems of the capital-rich countries, replacing a portion of
their diminishing working-age populations.
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These expenditures would not be foreign aid, but rather in the nature of
investments. The contracts would enable capital-rich, high-wage countries and laborrich, low-wage countries to take advantage of asymmetric levels of development without
incurring the political costs of massive migration. The contract could be written as a risksharing instrument at both ends, so that the investor country’s contributions would be
contingent on its GDP during the years of its payment, or could be based, like many
investments, on fixed payments by the investor in return for a share of a designated pool
of wealth or income later.173 The investment structure of the contract would produce
incentives, usually missing from foreign aid, for the investing countries to monitor and
police performance in the expenditure of their investments.
Would returns from the investment be meaningful? Consider the returns from an
index fund in the Chinese or Indian economy nowadays, when those two are doubling
every seven and ten years, respectively.174 The contract proposed here would be a way
for a country, or its pension system in particular, to make an investment of this form. The
terms of the contract, of course, would depend on the parties’ forecasts for the
performance of the developing economies; but that is nothing unusual in an investment
contract.
The attractiveness of an investment in this form would also depend on how the
investing companies construed their alternatives. Specifically, it would be reasonable to
compare the costs and benefits of alternative approaches to the fiscal problems that come
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with fertility decline. Earlier sections of this article have laid out the high costs of doing
nothing at all: a massive increase in the dependency ratio and a potentially crushing
burden on public pension systems. This section opened with a discussion of the political
costs of reducing the dependency ratio by increasing immigration levels: a rise in nativist
sentiment and backlash against liberalized immigration. The most politically attractive
solution, pro-natalist policies aimed at reconciling family and work, come at a high fiscal
cost and seem, from the experience of France and the Nordic countries, to cushion but not
avert the effects of fertility decline. Therefore, absent some new strategy, reciprocal
international investment would seem a fiscally attractive and politically viable way to
approach the problem. Naturally, there is no reason that adopting one solution would
exclude pursuing another at the same time. The aim would be an optimal mix of
strategies, measured both in present cost and in risk-discounted levels of expected
benefit. At a minimum, the contract envisioned here would be a strong candidate for a
place in that mix.
Would countries receiving payments in the early stages of the contract pay their
obligations later? There is no easy way to repossess years of investment in health and
education, and geriatric countries are not, other things equal, the most likely to go to war
to collect their pension payments.175 These concerns are not empty; but countries have a
remarkable record of faithfully repaying debt, even when the obligations date back to
now-repudiated regimes or the payments make up unconscionable shares of public
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expenditure.176 History provides as much reassurance as could reasonably be asked that
governments would honor the debts envisaged in these hypothetical contracts.
In this Part, I have argued that one partial solution to the problem of declining
fertility lies in novel financial arrangements that can make possible intergenerational
burden-sharing among nations. This approach might enable countries with declining
populations to take some of the benefits of increased immigration with the political costs.
In the next Part, I turn to a more basic approach to both declining fertility and sex
disproportion: promoting women’s substantive freedom.

V. Women’s Empowerment, Sex Ratios, and Politics: The Second Line of
Engagement
Both declining fertility and sex disproportion respond to the substantive freedom
of women. By “substantive freedom” I mean not just what women are formally
permitted to do, but what they are in fact able to do.177 For instance, while the absence of
a censorship law might constitute formal freedom to read about feminism or family
176
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planning, only literacy, combined with access to books, pamphlets, or online pages,
would count as substantive freedom to read; similarly, while women might be formally
allowed to enter the labor market, unequal education, a husband’s threat to punish a wife
for working, or the sexist attitudes of potential employers would all weigh against
counting women as substantively free to work.178 Because these distinctions may seem
fairly abstract, and their content will vary from context to context, I will now break down
the argument by way of particular cases.

A. Women’s Empowerment and Demographics
1. The contours of the problem
Conceptually, the basic strategies for addressing sex disproportion are to ban sex
selection, to appeal to culture by raising the status of women, and to appeal to economic
interest by decoupling family income and retirement security from the sex of children.
The obvious ways of pursuing each strategy turn out to be unsatisfactory because
relatively ineffectual179.
Begin with prohibition: banning (in order of increasing generality) sex-selective
abortion, pre-natal sex-identification, or technology that enables that identification
(regardless of its other uses). Of course, outright bans on technology such as ultrasound
178
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and amniocentesis bring their own costs in forgone medical capacity. More essentially,
the effectiveness of prohibition is uncertain at best. Where the technology is available
and parents want to use it, the procedures they seek seem to take place. Maharashtra, the
state where Bombay lies, banned abortions following sex-determination tests in 1988.180
The juvenile sex ratio there in 2001, however, stood at 109:100, more lopsided than in the
majority of Indian states and more pronounced than in Maharashtra in 1991, when many
juveniles had been born before the ban went into effect.181 The use of ultrasound
technology for prenatal sex determination is illegal throughout China, which has not yet
driven down the sex disproportion.182 There is, then, reason to doubt that bans on use of
medical procedures for sex-selection purposes are effective, at least under present cultural
and administrative conditions.
Changing economic incentives seems to make a difference, but at a high price.
Experiments in China’s Zhejiang province suggest that instituting old-age pensions can
indeed reduce the sex disproportion at birth.183 The main difficulty is that, thanks to the
one-child policy, China’s fertility rate now stands at 1.70 children per woman, compared
to 4.86 in 1970-75.184 The speed of that demographic contraction significantly outpaces
even those of Europe and Japan, which 30-40 years ago had much lower fertility rates
than China’s. China’s dependency ratio will thus skyrocket in the coming decades,
regardless of future trends in birthrates. Moreover, for all its extraordinary economic
growth, China remains on the whole a poor country, and one plagued by both
administrative difficulty in tax collection and serious, long-term uncertainty as to its
180
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political stability.185 If rich countries face serious questions about sustaining public
pensions through demographic contraction, the problem holds for China a fortiori.
Besides the raw fiscal difficulty of making a Chinese pension program work, political
uncertainty would reduce the effect of announced pension benefits on expectant parents.
Discounting for the possibility of state failure or crisis leading to a change in the policy,
many would still seek to have sons, to ensure against the disappearance of promised
benefits.
Raising the status of women is both attractive in concept and highly uncertain in
practice. The power of state policies to induce cultural change of this sort is uncertain.
China’s state education system is sex-neutral and has produced near-universal basic
education for women, but has not reduced the sex disproportion.186 Nor does economic
development seem to address women’s status automatically, by, for instance, promoting
egalitarian ideas. In India, the sex ratios for affluent, educated families are often worse
than for poorer families.187 Moreover, the low valuation of women feeds back into the
shaping of economic reality: given lower priority than their brothers, pressed to marry,
treated as subordinates by their husbands, and regarded as second-rate by employers,
women will not in fact enjoy the same earning power as men, even when they attain the
same level of education and are not formally barred from the workplace.
Nonetheless, the feedback between economics and culture runs in both directions,
and women who manage to make good on new economic alternatives may be able to
demand better treatment in their personal lives and incrementally change their cultural
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status.188 The problem is to find the right sequence of changes to set in motion a cycle of
increasing equality for women. I address that problem in the next section.189

2. Women’s substantive freedom: the key to a cycle of reform
As noted, sex ratios do not necessarily improve with general indicators of
progress in well-being. Amartya Sen reports that “variables that relate to the general
level of development and modernization either turn out to have no statistically significant
effect, or suggest that modernization … can even strengthen, rather than weaken, the
gender bias in child survival.”190 Such general indicators of development as urbanization,
male literacy, the availability of medical facilities, and the level of poverty, either fail to
mitigate the sex disproportion or intensify it.191 Falling poverty rates, in particular, are
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sometimes associated with an increase in the sex disproportion.192 (These figures refer to
the sex ratio in the overall population and in the population surviving early childhood. I
say more later about the implications for the sex ratio at birth.)
None of this is particularly counter-intuitive, given a family preference for sons
over daughters. Wealth and medical resources increase power over reproduction. Male
literacy means access to information about medical procedures, urbanization means
proximity to sophisticated medical technology, the prevalence of medical facilities speaks
for itself, and growing wealth brings the capacity to pay for procedures such as pre-natal
sex-determination and abortion. Generally speaking, greater resources will mean greater
capacity to bring about what a family desires, and millions of family-level decisions will
register as systemic demographic effects.193
What is interesting is to disaggregate the family, asking whether the preference
for sons is common to all members or enforced by husbands, and, if the latter, under what
conditions women might enforce a contrary preference. On this point there is
provocative evidence regarding sex disparities in early-childhood survival. While
general indicators of development do not mitigate this disparity, two other variables do
reduce inequality in children’s survival: women’s literacy and women’s labor force
participation.194 These are indicators of development; but they are also, specifically,
indicators of the level at which women have participated in the benefits of development.
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These data suggest that as women gain practical capacity, they enforce a relatively sexequitable use of family resources, with great benefits for the survival of female children.
In making sense of this phenomenon, it is helpful to follow Sen in treating
families as sites of “cooperative conflict.” 195 In this model, partly congruent and partly
conflicting individual interests (including values and beliefs, which may of course
include commitment to the family itself as a unit distinct from the sum of its parts) yield a
“solution” for the family’s use of resources. The solution includes both a set of priorities
and a set of decision-making procedures for setting or balancing priorities.196 A solution
may be either relatively egalitarian or relatively inegalitarian, both in its
acknowledgement of the preferences of different family members and in the role it gives
each family member in setting priorities.197 Applying this model to the issue of
childhood survival suggests that, while a generic increase in the resources available to the
family does little to make the solution more sex-egalitarian, an increase in women’s
195
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capacities enables them to enforce egalitarian solutions. How far literacy and access to
work increase the standing, self-confidence, or other factors of “voice” within the family,
and how far they rather change negotiating positions by creating an “exit” option into an
alternative life is unclear, but some combination of effects is intuitive.198 What seems
clear, however, is that when they can, women tend to enforce a use of family resources
that supports the survival of girls as well as boys.
It does not follow from this that women’s empowerment also diminishes sexselective abortion. That would depend foremost on why women insist on sex-equitable
solutions within the family: for reasons of sex egalitarianism or out of love for existing
children. Mitigation of sex disparities in childhood survival rates might reflect
indiscriminate love for children once born, meaning mothers would stick up for their
living daughters, but not refuse sex-selective abortions. Alternatively, sex-neutral
maternal concern might extend to potential children. As a third possibility, empowered
mothers might be resisting the valuation of male over female lives in general. If either
the second or third alternative explained a significant share of the improvement of girls’
survival rates where women are empowered, then women’s increased capacities should
also translate into successful resistance to sex-selective abortion, and thus to improved
sex ratios at birth.
Moreover, it would be artificial to imagine that the motives women bring to bear
on reproductive decisions are constant, changing only as women’s capacity to effect their
198
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aims waxes and wanes. In fact, economic power and cultural status are intuitively
connected here. An increase in women’s capacity will bring new experiences that, in
turn, all but ensure new priorities for both women and men.199 Where women work
outside the home and can read, the result is a different set of everyday interactions,
expectations, and experiences of capacity, all redounding to women’s sense of agency in
general and to the goals and priorities they set.200

3. Fertility and women’s substantive freedom
In wealthy, broadly liberal settings such as Europe (and to a lesser degree Japan
and South Korea), the basic substantive freedoms that count so much for women’s wellbeing in poor countries are secure. The relevant question is not whether women are
substantively free (i.e., are in fact able) to enter the workforce and to influence family
decisions about resources and reproduction. More significant is the structure of the
tradeoffs women and families confront in making the decisions that shape a personal life
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and a career: whether to enter a reproductive partnership, whether to have a first child,
whether to have a second or third child, whether to enter and remain in a career, whether
to leave the workforce. While there may be neither formal nor significant practical
barriers to a woman’s making any one of the decisions just listed, the opportunity cost of
each may be such that certain combinations of choices are effectively impossible. If rich
and poor alike are free to sleep under the bridges of Paris, so, too, are women free to leap
those bridges in a single bound, with a child on one hip and a briefcase on the other.
How many will be able to do so is another question.
It is, moreover, a question that public policy can influence. As noted, Philip
Longman has argued that the cost to a middle-class American family of raising a child
through age 17 is about one million dollars, the lion’s share in forgone wages by one
parent.201 Longman’s contention is that American families would prefer to have more
children than they in fact do, but are deterred by the cost of childrearing.202 Thirty-eight
percent of French women report that three children is the ideal number for a family, but
fewer than 15 percent have that number.203 As noted, German poll results suggest a
preference for family size below the replacement rate; but this preference may in part
reflect recognition of the costs of childrearing.204
These figures suggest that public policy increases the substantive freedom of
women and families when it reduces the opportunity costs of bearing and rearing children
in terms of workplace participation, and vice-versa. An increase in substantive freedom
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along these dimensions, other things equal, will mean increasing the number of children
families have by reducing the marginal cost of each. Put differently, the goal would be
reconciliation of two kinds of choices: the choice to bear children and the choice to work.
Reconciliation has been the goal of French family-support policy since 1994, and it has
come along with an increase in the country’s fertility rate in recent years, after three
decades of decline.205 Moreover, France’s fertility rate has passed 1.9, making it the
highest in the European Union (tied with Ireland) and significantly higher than those just
below it, Luxembourg (1.78) and Finland (1.73).206 The country’s fertility rate is high
despite the fact that France has one of the EU’s highest rates of two-earner families, with
70 percent of those including two full-time workers.207 Eighty-one percent of women
with one child and sixty-nine percent of women with two children are in the
workforce.208 These figures suggest that France’s goal of reconciliation has found some
success.
Several kinds of transfers, targeted subsidies, and state-provided services work to
reduce the cost of French children to their parents. Direct per-child payments (beginning
once a family has two children) set a baseline, with both payments and tax breaks rising
further for families with three or more children.209 Paid maternity and paternity leave
policies rise to a three-year income entitlement for mothers (and occasionally fathers) of
a third child who opt to leave work for that period.210 Most significant for the goal of
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reconciliation is an extensive scheme of child care, including state-financed nurseries for
children under three, schools beginning at age 3, and tax-breaks and subsides for in-home
child-care.211 The effect is to reduce a panoply of childrearing costs: the danger of losing
one’s job, the direct cost of care, and the income loss from forgone employment. The
ultimate goal is to soften the often stark choice between bearing and raising children and
remaining employed.
It is instructive to contrast the French experience with those of other European
countries. Indeed, Europe presents a laboratory of federalist experimentation with
fertility policy. Spain, which since the end of Franco’s fascist regime has pursued a
passive policy that relies on families to make reproductive decisions and to care for their
own children, has gone from having Europe’s second-highest fertility rate in 1971 to one
of its lowest today.212 Germany provides relatively generous welfare-state support, but
until recently has offered little in the way of subsidized care for the pre-school children of
working mothers, and gives significantly shorter maternity leaves (at 14 weeks) than
France.213 The country’s overall family-support policy, while it consumes 2.7 percent of
GDP, consists of pocketbook transfers that create no meaningful infrastructure to reduce
the burdens of child care and directly reconcile work and family.214 German fertility
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rates remain much lower than France’s, as the high opportunity cost of childbearing
presses the average age of mothers at first birth to nearly 30.215
The Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden and Norway, follow a familysupport policy much nearer France’s, emphasizing reconciliation of work and family.
They enjoy commensurately higher fertility rates. Norway guarantees 44 weeks of paid
maternity leave, about three-fifths as much paid paternity leave, and an option of either
tacking on a year’s unpaid leave or accepting substantial, income-scaled subsidies for
child care.216 Sweden provides 390 days of paid leave, which parents can divide as they
wish (except for sixty days set aside for the secondary care-giver, a gesture toward
gender equity).217 Public childcare, which in Scandinavia has always aimed at
reconciling work and family on ground of gender equity, enables about two-thirds of
Swedish mothers with young children to work outside the home.218 A remarkable feature
of Swedish demography is that fertility is “pro-cyclical,” that is, positively related to
women’s earnings and employment levels, suggesting that Sweden’s policies of
reconciliation have substantially reduced the tradeoff between women’s equal economic
participation and childbearing.219
That such policies are costly hardly needs remarking. Crudely put, they are
subsidies for the production of a valuable resource: replacements for the present
215
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generation of workers and taxpayers. Regarded as a subsidy they are open to plausible
justification: parents absorb much of the cost, and all the employment-based opportunity
cost, of their children, while reaping only a tiny and diffuse share of their children’s later
contribution to the economy.220 The massive positive externalities of children are
sufficient reason to encourage their production.
A complementary rationale is the increase in women’s substantive freedom which
reconciliation policies produce. This freedom is valuable not just because it induces
higher fertility rates, but also as a social goal in itself. In developing countries, increases
in substantive freedom press fertility rates downward as women exercise newfound
agency to resist pro-natal norms that have long been enforced coercively, either directly
or by lack of meaningful alternatives.221 In wealthy countries, however, the effect may
be the opposite: with expanded sets of viable choices, women and families are
particularly interested in reconciling several kinds of goods, such as career and
childrearing. There, an increase in substantive freedom will mean an increase in fertility
rates over present levels, which partly reflect the costly tradeoffs of choosing to have
children. A society with greater substantive freedom to reconcile such complementary
goals is a freer society.
As noted earlier, such policies may not increase fertility to the replacement rate in
many rich societies. Estimates of the elasticity of parents’ decision to bear children even
in France suggest as much – although one must bear in mind that such indifference
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curves are artifacts of personality and culture, not natural kinds.222 Replacement-level
fertility, however, need not be the standard of success. Policies that can mitigate the
effects of fertility decline while increasing substantive freedom are desirable in both
respects, even if they cannot carry the whole weight of the task.

VI. Women, politics, and extremism
The falling fertility rates of rich countries and the rising sex disproportion of poor
countries both conjure up alarming political associations. In Europe, particularly,
perceptions of demographic decline are historically associated with reactionary and
authoritarian politics. In India and China, as elsewhere, large populations of unmarried
young men are ideal recruitment targets for ultra-nationalists and other extremist
movements. In the last Part, I argued that increases in women’s substantive freedoms can
mitigate the two demographic crises, and thus also diminish their consequences. Here, I
present tantalizing evidence that women’s substantive freedoms may also have a direct
effect on politics, tending to make extremism and authoritarianism less potent. If this is
true, than women’s empowerment is an apt response to the demographic crises on both
the level of demography and the level of politics.

A. Women’s Empowerment and Democracy: A First Pass
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One of the most provocative forays into this issue is by political scientist M.
Steven Fish.223 Fish was drawn to the question of why predominantly Islamic countries
are less democratic than others, even correcting for levels of economic development
(widely acknowledged to correspond to democratic governance).224 Dissatisfied with the
generalization that Islam is culturally hostile to democracy in some ill-specified way,
Fish introduced a new independent variable: the subordination of women, as measured by
women’s literacy, sex ratios in the living population, and the percentage of high
government posts occupied by women.225 The preceding discussion suggests that the
first two are particularly apt indicators, as literacy affects women’s agency in family and
social life and sex ratios express women’s agency or lack of it. Taking as dependent
variable the numerical assessment of democratic governance assigned each country in the
world by the governance-monitoring organization Freedom House, Fish found that each
of his indicators of women’s subordination significantly reduced the explanatory power
of a country’s predominantly Islamic or non-Islamic population makeup.226 Fish offered
several provisional theoretical speculations about the causal story behind these findings.
Perhaps male domination in family and social life sows authoritarian habits of arbitrary
power in some, craven subordination in others, and diminishes the expectation that power
in general should be answerable to either egalitarian principles or demands for reasongiving.227 Perhaps the integration of women into a variety of social, economic, and
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political contexts induces different, less authoritarian behavior in the men of those
contexts.228 Perhaps, for whatever reasons, women tend to hold attitudes less conducive
to authoritarianism than men’s, such as weaker tastes for domination and hierarchy or a
preference for cooperative or consensual problem-solving.229
This is not the place to attempt an assessment of these competing but potentially
complementary explanations. For my part, I am intensely skeptical of arguments that
suppose any “essential” social or political attitudes inherent in men or women, and
reflexively friendly toward arguments that emphasize the variation in potential attitudes
within both sexes, depending on institutional and cultural context.230 My own
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discussions in this Part reflect that emphasis, treating women as agents and bearers of
interests inflected by revisable self-conceptions, rather than as vectors of essentially
”feminine” values or social modes.
In this sub-part, I offer one specific suggestion about the significance socially and
politically empowered women for the kinds of nationalist and other extremist politics
whose appeal is the special political concern of this article. Today, the ideological appeal
of such nationalism almost always involves a reaction to women’s increased social
participation and power within the family, and a proposal to restore “traditional”
relations. This attitude holds for the Shiv Sena and other Hindu nationalists,231 Islamists,
232

and smaller-scale reactionary movements that revive such customs as belief in and

persecution of witches as a way of constraining empowered women.233 To the extent that
women have become invested in both their new capabilities and an expanded view of
their interests and potential agency, they might well experience contemporary nationalist
movements as a direct threat. This interpretation avoids essentialist speculation about
women’s intrinsic attitudes toward hierarchy or the effect of feminine presence on
institutional culture. Instead, this interpretation focuses on the concrete fact that most
contemporary nationalism and related extremism presents a threat to the status and
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participation that increase women’s power to control resources, exercise power within the
family, and influence reproductive decisions.
This interpretation is quite plausible in Europe, and may help to explain why
declining fertility has not produced a meaningful upsurge in support for nationalist
agendas there. It is not that there has been no effort to yoke such agendas to concern
about falling population. On the contrary, France’s far-right National Front has linked
demographic alarms to attacks on abortion rights and calls for restoring women’s
traditional roles as mothers and housewives.234 This classic expression of reactionary
pro-natalism, however, has found little traction in contemporary France, where women’s
integration into political and economic life has shifted even mainstream pro-natalist
positions from a first-generation emphasis on children as social resources to solicitude for
women’s autonomy that falls much nearer the spirit of the second-generation
commitment to autonomy. As Marie-Therese Letablier notes, twentieth-century French
family policy rested originally on “the idea that children were a collective investment,”
and thus “[m]others of numerous children were rewarded for being ‘good citizens’ by
giving children to the Nation.”235 In recent decades, however, this sex-specific idea of
citizenship, in which women’s civic role is substantially identical with their biological
function, has given way to a relatively gender-equitable concern with women’s capacity
to reconcile family and work commitments.236 This reconciliation-oriented approach is
compatible with recognizing that there is a collective interest in the aggregate results of
individual reproductive decisions; in this respect, it comes to grips with contemporary
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demographic problems. The reconciliation-oriented approach, however, is not
compatible with the historical impulse of pro-natalist politics: coercion in reproductive
decisions and insistence on a return to traditional sex and gender roles. It makes room to
acknowledge the social interest in reproductive decisions, but bounds that interest by
principles of autonomy and gender equity.
This analysis gives cause for guarded optimism. It suggests that some kinds of
progress are hard to reverse – specifically, that once women are integrated into political
and economic life on relatively equitable terms, their commitment to their own
substantive freedoms will constrain the potential scope of reactionary politics.237 In this
respect, at least, history may not be prologue: past episodes of reactionary pro-natalism
occurred in times and places where women were much more economically and politically
vulnerable than in Europe today. Conversely, if political commitments to women’s
substantive freedoms are fairly stable, this means that acknowledging demographic
concerns in politics and policy may not be worrisome as it has sometimes seemed in a
period haunted by the ugly memory of first-generation biopolitics.
This hopeful point, however, leaves open two major reasons for concern. One is
that women’s gains in substantive freedom may remain quite vulnerable outside Europe,
both in Japan and Korea, where fertility is well below replacement rate, and in countries
where the demographic problem is sex disproportion. Because women’s substantive
freedoms are both the best means to address the demographic problems themselves and,
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maybe, a check on the extremist politics that otherwise tend to accompany both
demographic crises, their fragility is worrisome. Second, even assuming that women’s
substantive freedoms are good checks against reactionary pro-natalist politics, there is
less reason to believe they would similarly check the nativist and racist politics that might
accompany a large increase in the number of immigrants to Europe or East Asia.

B. Family dynamics and authoritarianism
As noted in the last sub-part, I am sympathetic to hypotheses about the
relationship between’s women’s empowerment and politics that avoid speculation about
the “essential” attitudes of men and women and instead look to the interaction of
institutions, practices, and values in shaping gender roles and gendered self-conceptions.
An intriguing body of recent research that might illuminate the relationship between
family structure and authoritarianism glimpsed in the last sub-part is that of political
scientist Karen Stenner.238 Stenner’s work is worth engaging here for two reasons. First,
she has single-handedly revivified what had been a moribund social-science response to
an urgent question: why some individuals are attracted to authoritarian political
movements and others not – a question with large and straightforward application to this
article’s concerns about the future of liberal and democratic political values.239 Second,
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Authoritarian Personality in 1950. See T.W. ADORNO, et al., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
(1950). Sponsored and copyrighted by the American Jewish Committee, this massive study was a direct
response to the arresting fact that Nazism had some to power in an educated, democratic, and, it would
have seemed, relatively liberal society. The motive to make sense of the fascist appeal through social
psychology, however, went back at least to Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom, published early in the
Second World War. See ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941). Subsequently, Robert
Jay Lifton pursued Fromm’s and Adorno’s psychoanalytic approach to the problem, asking how the
apocalyptic political impulse arises, persuading adherents that a climactic act of violence can make the
world whole and pure. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, DESTROYING THE WORLD TO SAVE IT:AUM
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Stenner’s response to the methodological problems that had led this line of inquiry to an
impasse turns on a connection between normative ideas of the family and susceptibility to
authoritarian appeals in politics.240 Although Stenner does not develop her argument in
this direction, her research suggests that the degree of reciprocity in family
decisionmaking may train people to expect greater or lesser degrees of reciprocity, and
thus of persuasion and negotiation rather than authoritarian command, in social and
political life generally.241 I begin with the contribution of Stenner’s work to the
methodology of authoritarian studies, then connect her work with the argument of this
Part.
Of all the questions one might want social science to answer, one of the most
consequential is why authoritarian politics succeeds or fails. Authoritarian movements
and governments have been the bane of democracies throughout the twentieth century,
from Nazism to today’s radical Hindu and Islamist politics: wherever they come to power
through elections, indeed wherever they attract popular support, they imply that
democracy may be self-undermining, at least under certain circumstances. Since
Theodor Adorno and his collaborators began trying to understand variation in individual
attraction to fascism in Nazi Germany, students of authoritarian disposition have broadly
agreed on the types of political attitudes they seek to understand: “suppression of [moral,
SHINRIKYO, APOCALYTPIC VIOLENCE, AND THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM (1999).
Departing sharply from the psychodynamic approach, Canadian political psychologist Bob Altemeyer has
described authoritarian attitudes as a product of “social learning,” a package of attitudes acquired and
reinforced in one’s social setting rather than related to any predisposition firmly established in early life.
See BOB ALTEMEYER, ENEMIES OF FREEDOM: UNDERSTANDING RIGHT-WING
AUTHORITARIANISM (1988). Others have stayed with the idea of strong predispositions, but looked to
biological rather than social bases for these. See C.S. Bergeman, et al., Genetic and Environmental Effects
on Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness: An Adoption/Twin Study,” 61 J. OF
PERSONALITY 159 (1993).
240
See STENNER, supra n. 230 at 23-25 (laying out her approach).
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This sketch of possible lines of causation lines up with the “reciprocity” hypothesis about the connection
between women’s empowerment and political freedom that I discuss in n. 228, supra, and accompanying
text.
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cultural, and/or racial] difference and insistence upon uniformity,” expressed in politics
through “autocratic social arrangements in which individual autonomy yields to group
authority.”242 These attitudes characterized fascist and nationalist movements in the early
and middle decades of the twentieth century, and they characterize today’s forms of
extremism as well.243
Yet the distinctness of the problem has not inspired methodological lucidity.
Instead, several persistent problems led to the neglect and eclipse of the study of
authoritarian disposition. First was a confusion of independent and dependent variables:
the entanglement of the supposed object of the study – a disposition to authoritarian
appeals – with its ostensible expression, adherence to authoritarian political beliefs.244
Students of authoritarianism have identified bearers of authoritarian disposition by
measuring expression of authoritarian beliefs, effectively collapsing the distinction
between disposition and authoritarianism itself, and thus producing a circular definition
of the authoritarian disposition: the disposition evidenced by expression of the very
authoritarian beliefs that the disposition was meant to explain.245 Second was a related
conceptual failure: the conflation of “authoritarian” attitudes with the political program of
“right-wing” parties in the home countries of the investigators, so that “authoritarianism”
gets run together with the conservative distaste for change and disruption in general, and
242

See id. at 15. Stenner elsewhere elaborates on her findings in connection with this model:
“authoritarians proved to be greatly alarmed by departures from moral and cultural absolutism, by any
deviation from unquestioning conformity to external authority. And most characteristic of all, they
invariably looked first to leaders and institutions to reinstate and reinforce the normative order, seeking to
marshal the authority of the state to ‘institute’ the maintenance of ‘civility’ and ‘hold up our moral
values[.]’ Id. at 267.
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II.C, supra.
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See STENNER, supra n. 230 at 20-23 (outlining this problem).
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See R. Nevitt Sanford, et al, The Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends, in ADORNO, et al.,
supra n. 231 at 222-279 (explaining the method of measuring the authoritarian personality, the nownotorious “F Scale”). Altemeyer’s “Right-Wing Authoritarianism” suffers from the same difficulty. See
ALTEMEYER, supra n. 231.
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with the libertarian preference for free markets over directive or redistributive social
polcy.246 Third, besides failing to generate a tractable definition of the authoritarian
disposition that does not collapse into a description of current politics – and mostly local
politics, at that – theorists have mostly lacked any account of what brings the disposition
into action in political life: Why, if such a disposition exists, do authoritarian appeals fall
on deaf ears in some places and times and gather followers in others?247
Stenner’s response is to isolate a relatively non-partisan definition of
“authoritarian” disposition, distinct from conservative and libertarian outlooks, which
does not depend on the same political attitudes that it is supposed to predict. She uses
this definition to develop a testable theory of why the authoritarian disposition manifests
itself in intolerant political attitudes in some contexts, but not in others. Stenner
identifies authoritarianism with “some general desire … to transfer sovereignty to, and
commit self and others to conformity with some collective order,” that is, a deep-set
belief that the security and trustworthiness of the social world depend on “collective
authority and conformity … oneness and sameness.”248 On Stenner’s account, this
disposition finds expression under circumstances of “normative threat,” when the
“collective order” is threatened by conflicting values, “moral decay,” or evidence that
political leaders are unreliable.249 Thus in times of apparent stability and normative
agreement, authoritarians’ views may not differ sharply from those of others. When
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See STENNER, supra n. 230 at 138-98 (comparing authoritarian with conservative dispositions), 236-68
(comparing authoritarian with libertarian dispositions). This confusion has the methodologically unsettling
consequence that, for instance, Russian communists who abhor the chaos of quasi-democratic capitalism
score high on a “right-wing authoritarianism” measure that includes a preference for libertarian economic
policies as part of its definition of authoritarianism. See id. at 149-50 (reporting and commenting on this
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events conspire to present “normative threat,” however, authoritarians will respond with
more conformist and punitive positions than non-authoritarians, and will make a high
priority of reconstituting a stable and trustworthy authority.250 By contrast, libertarians
are much less likely to express increasingly authoritarian views even under conditions of
normative threat.251 Conservatives, while resistant to change and often to disagreement,
tend to be hostile to the drastic programs that most distinctively characterize authoritarian
politics: efforts to reconstitute authority in the face of perceived breakdown, which
various forms of nationalism and fascism exemplify.252
Stenner ties this abstract account of authoritarian disposition to a set of nonpolitical attitudes that, she hypothesizes, should predict the disposition: normative ideas
of the family and of the kind of adult personality that childrearing aims to produce. She
identifies those attitudes through responses to questions designed to probe childrearing
values, chiefly by asking respondents to rank as more important one of a pair of qualities
that parents might seek to inculcate in their children.253 The pairings are on the model of
the following alternative goals: “that [the child] follows the rules” or “that he follows his
own conscience,” and “that he has respect for his elders” or “that he thinks for
himself.”254 In Stenner’s account, such questions effectively and unobtrusively elicit
basic orientations toward the relative value and importance of authority and uniformity
versus autonomy and diversity; moreover, they do so in a setting with high stakes for the
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See id. at 26-29, 85-98 (outlining authoritarian responses to normative threat and contrasting these with
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constitute normative threat for authoritarians are in fact evidence of “moral decay”).
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respondents – the raising of children.255 There is thus reason to believe that the answers
should capture genuine, deep-set attitudes.256 And, in fact, Stenner has found that high
scores on her childrearing-based authoritarianism index correspond to heightened levels
of authoritarian attitudes under conditions of normative threat, suggesting that the index
captures the disposition she hypothesizes.257
It is critical to Stenner’s methodological contribution that she treat her index of
childrearing values as an independent variable. I suspect that is why does not advance
the extension of her research that I am about to suggest. Her work is most interesting
when one keeps in mind that normative conceptions of the family and the adult
personality that childrearing should produce are not natural facts. Rather, they emerge
from ideological and material contests: on the one hand, contests of ideas about what
defines a good or just family and a good or dignified person; on the other hand, contests
over control of resources, which structure the “cooperative competition” within families.
Both kinds of contests contribute to each succeeding generation’s idea of what families
should be.258 Vivid examples, such as the relative increase in girls’ survival through
infancy when their mothers become literate and join the workforce, suggest that the
family becomes a very different thing, normatively and practically, as the social world of
values and resources changes around it.259 So far as the resulting normative idea of the
family serves as a proxy for authoritarian disposition, changes in the direction of gender
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It strikes me as a fair concern that there is indeed a politics of parenting, and people’s ideological and
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cultural politics of the Christian Right in the United States will confirm this point. That said, however,
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equity may reduce the prevalence of authoritarian attitudes by modeling the family as a
set of relatively reciprocal relationships, open in some measure to renegotiation, in which
all members have some claim to attention and respect.260
The argument comes back, then, to women’s substantive freedom and its impact
on the order of the family – now understood both as a practical arrangement of resources
and decisionmaking and as the home of normative ideas of human personality and
relationships. This time, however, women’s substantive freedom is an instance of a more
general ideal: reciprocity of respect, power, and affection between sexes and among
family members more generally.261 Stenner’s argument and evidence suggest, although
they do not demonstrate, that such reciprocity tends to make the family a schoolhouse of
non-authoritarian dispositions, a formative object lesson in the belief that order and
security do not require autocratic authority and abject conformity. If this is right, then the
same increases in women’s substantive freedom that counteract demographic crises
generally may also work through the family to diminish the political appetite for
reactionary programs that demographic crises otherwise tend to strengthen.
It should be clear here that in speaking of relations between the sexes in the
family, I ultimately refer to relations among persons. Similarly, in discussing women’s
substantive freedom, I am discussing a sub-set of the substantive freedom of human
beings. The reason to emphasize women’s relative positions is that under present
circumstances their relative lack of resources and alternatives, and thus of certain
domains of substantive freedom, feeds into reproductive decisions and, arguably, politics
in troubling ways. The more general hope contained in this argument is increases in
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freedom and reciprocity generally might tend to reduce the paradoxes of individual and
political freedom. That, however, is a question for another time.

VII. Conclusion
Whether freedom is sometimes self-undermining is an old question, but not a tired
one. Asking it is an important way of ensuring that we do what is necessary to preserve
essentail freedoms. In this spirit, I have argued that reproductive autonomy can produce
social and political consequences that might endanger liberal freedoms. The argument is
not an attack on reproductive autonomy, but a reflection on what might be necessary to
preserve it.262 In different cultural, economic, and political settings, increasing control
over the number and the sex of children has produced sub-replacement fertility rates and
a growing sexual disproportion among children and young adults. Both trends contribute
to potential political crises: a demographically inflected crisis of the welfare state on the
one hand, and a potential for growth in authoritarian parties and institutions on the other.
The most promising response is not to cut back on reproductive autonomy, but to
deepen and broaden it by seeking to increase the bases of women’s substantive freedom:
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Some readers, particularly Neil Siegel, have suggested that the appeal of this article’s argument might be
entirely independent of the reader’s beliefs about the moral status of abortion: those who favor reproductive
choice, as I do, should find in the paper an analysis of a potential threat to it and a response that is
compatible with preserving it; while those who oppose reproductive choice should still be persuaded that
sex-egalitarian social relations and reconciliation of childbearing and career are attractive ways to mitigate
serious demographic crises. While this “overlapping consensus” view of the article is plausible and has
some appeal to me, I prefer to leave it as a speculative matter rather than insist on who should agree with
me and why. My motivations are to address potential threats to three values I hold dear: liberalism,
democracy, and a vision of sexual equality that includes formal and substantive reproductive autonomy.
Anyone who shares all or some of these values and is persuaded by my analysis might well join in my
conclusions. I suspect, however, that readers who regard abortion as deeply wrong will find the entire
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in developing countries, education and workforce participation; in rich countries, the
capacity of women and families to reconcile work and childrearing.263 Although best
paired with other policies, a focus on increasing substantive freedom belongs at the heart
of a political response to both demographic crises. Promoting substantive freedom is not
just normatively attractive from a liberal perspective: it is also the best practical solution
to the paradoxes of autonomy. In this case, at least, the answer to freedom’s selfundermining potential is to become freer still.
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This is a slightly rhetorical way of putting the matter. As I note particularly in n. 175, supra, it may not
be possible to produce a unified metric of “substantive autonomy.” In any event, that is not a task I have
attempted here. A more analytically precise way of putting the matter is that substantive reproductive
autonomy’s aggregate results are less likely to undermine liberal or democratic values to the extent that
reproductive autonomy is complemented by substantive freedom in literacy, workforce participation, and
the capacity to reconcile childbearing with career. Thus enhancing these dimensions of substantive
autonomy is likely to be an effective as well as a normatively attractive response to the problems of thirdgeneration biopolitics. This autonomy-enhancing response should be taken as a progressive alternative to
the attacks on reproductive autonomy, formal and substantive, that might accompany the illiberal dangers
of third-generation biopolitics.
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